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This dissertation studies a general class of resource allocation games in com-
puter systems. The applications of these games include sharing network band-
width, scheduling jobs in data centers and distributing click-through resources
in sponsored search.
The main focus of the dissertation is the revenue that can be obtained by
providers. We investigate the revenue of proportional sharing under a symme-
try condition among users, and show how to modify this mechanism to get a
competitive revenue without the symmetry condition. We study the weighted
proportional sharing mechanism as a natural extension of fair sharing to capture
the incentives of revenue maximizing providers.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
New internet technologies over the past decade have been changing economies
and societies around the world. These innovations, varying from information
retrieval, social networks to electronic commerce, are creating a trend in infor-
mation technology, namely, the merging of human collective behavior and tech-
nologies to create knowledge on a global scale.
Computer science, the main science behind this technology trend, is facing
many great challenges. The traditional computing models of Turing machines,
which assume that the designer has a full control on the input information and
the execution of the program, are unrealistic in many modern applications. Pri-
mary examples of these applications include the internet routing networks that
consist of multiple routers making independent decisions based on local infor-
mation and several applications in electronic commerce where information is
held by self-interested agents.
In the past decade an important line of research in theoretical computer sci-
ence, known as algorithmic game theory, has emerged as an interdisciplinary re-
search area between algorithms and game theory. This is a subfield of theoretical
computer science that evolved from studying computer programs executed by
stand-alone machines to complex systems involving a large number of agents,
who pursue their own interests. Algorithmic game theory has become a natural
research area that uses game theoretical approaches to investigate many prob-
lems in algorithm design and studies several concepts of game theory using
algorithmic methods. Algorithmic game theory formulates new problems and
develops novel solutions for relevant modern computer science applications.
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This dissertation studies a general class of resource allocation games in com-
puting systems, an important topic of algorithmic game theory. The focus of
this study is on the design of decentralized mechanisms to allocate resources
to self-interested agents. Game theoretical approaches for resource allocation
problems overcome the drawbacks of centralized scheduling algorithms, where
private information on the needs of agents is assumed to be available.
The main starting point of this dissertation is to study the revenue that can be
obtained by the providers. This is an important question because in many cases
the mechanisms are designed by providers who care about profit. Even when
providers can only use a certain type of mechanisms, it is often the case that this
class of mechanisms has a flexibility for providers to choose some parameters.
In these scenarios provider will also adjust the parameters to maximize their
revenue.
There is a large literature in resource allocation games and proportional shar-
ing mechanism that we study in this dissertation. However, most of the works
along this line focus on the social welfare of the system. Another difference
of our studies, compared with the literature, is the solution concept that we
use. In traditional mechanism design, revenue maximizing auctions are stud-
ied in Bayesian settings, where the type of each player is drawn form commonly
known distributions. In this thesis we use the concept of Nash equilibrium in full
information settings, where providers do not know users’ private information or
they need to use simple and natural mechanisms.
Mathematically, we study an abstract resource allocation game, where the
resource constraints can be captured by a general polyhedron. This class of
games captures a wide range of applications in computer science, varying from
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sharing network bandwidth to scheduling jobs in data centers and distributing
click-through resources in sponsored search. By taking a general approach, we
can investigate different problems in a unified framework and use techniques
developed in one problem for another. We now start with some simple exam-
ples to illustrate the content of the dissertation.
1.1 Illustrating Examples
In our resource allocation games, we assume that there are n users, and the goal
of the game is to determine a real valued outcome xi ≥ 0 for each player i, which
we think of as the player’s level of activity or allocation. Each user has a non
negative, monotone increasing and concave utility function Ui(xi). Each user
maximizes his pay-off which is assumed to be the difference between the utility
and his payment Ui(xi) − pi.
Fair Sharing for Single Resource and Equilibrium Price The simplest exam-
ple in resource allocation games is the case of sharing an infinitely divisible
resource of capacity 1 to a set of n users, each submits a non negative number
(bid) bi. The allocation xi to user i is set proportional to bi as follows:
xi =
bi∑
j b j
,
and the payment that user i will need to pay is bi.
There are many other alternative mechanisms for this simple auction, such
as the the first and second price auction, but the proportional sharing is a natural
and simple mechanism. Most importantly, proportional sharing is scalable for
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a wide class of users’ utility functions, for example, any concave function Ui(xi),
a scenario, where in the first or second price auctions users need to report the
whole utility function.
The fair sharing mechanism above also provides a framework of recovering
the market cleaning price via a decentralized implementation. The market clean-
ing price in this setting is an unit price p, such that when each user chooses to
buy an xi fraction of the resource to maximize his payoff Ui(xi) − pxi, (equiv-
alently, U′i (xi) = p if xi > 0) the total demand
∑
i xi is equal to the available
resource, in our case ∑i xi = 1. Now, in proportional sharing, each user chooses
a bid bi and because of the proportional sharing rule, we always have
∑
i xi = 1.
Furthermore, when the mechanism reaches a Nash equilibrium, then the price
per unit that each user pays is the same and equal to bixi =
∑
i bi, which is not
exactly the market cleaning price. However, it can be shown that when the
number of users increases, this value approaches to the market cleaning price.
The proportional sharing mechanism also captures the effect of each individ-
ual user on the equilibrium price. Classical economic theory sometimes explains
the market equilibrium by models consisting of infinitely many buyers where
individual’s strategy does not affect the price of the whole market. This assump-
tion is not a reasonable in many settings. The proportional sharing mechanism
overcomes this criticism by the fact that users’ strategies do affect the unit price
of resources. In other words, the users are “price anticipating”.
More General Settings Another advantage of the fair sharing mechanism is
that it can be extended to a much more general setting. Consider the following
example. The service provider can either serve a single user (numbered 0) or a
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set of other users (numbered from 1 to n). If randomization is allowed then this
setting can be captured by the following inequality system
x0 + xi ≤ 1 ∀ i ∈ [1, .., n].
This inequality system captures exactly the following network bandwidth shar-
ing game. User 0 is interested in a path of bandwidth x0 containing n different
edges e1, .., en, each with a capacity of 1. User i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is only interested in a
path containing single edge ei. See Figure 1.1.
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Figure 1.1: Network bandwidth sharing and downward close set system.
The proportional sharing mechanism can be extended for this setting as fol-
lows. User 0 bids a non negative number bi0 on each edge of the graph and user
i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, only bids bi on the edge ei. The mechanism will use the fair sharing
on each link. User i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n pays bi and gets
xi =
bi
bi + bi0
.
User 0 pays ∑i bi0 and gets
x0 = mini
bi0
bi + bi0
.
Similar to the case of a single resource discussed above, the sum of the bids
on each link can be seen as the price of each resource, which is determined
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by the demand of the users. It is also well understood that in the computer
network setting, these prices have an interpretation of the average delay on each
link [30, 29].
Proportional Sharing for a General Polyhedron In this thesis, we study this
proportional sharing and extend it for an even more general setting that we
call polyhedral environment. This will be defined more formally in Chapter 3.
Intuitively, each edge in the example of the network above corresponds to a
linear constraint of a general polyhedron. We will see later in Chapter 4 that,
in the auction setting one can think of this generalized proportional sharing
as a way to design competition among users. Moreover, this general problem
captures many other applications, including the sponsored search auction. Our
approach gives a rich model for this application because it can model complex
externalities among advertisers.
1.2 The Questions and Contributions of the Thesis
Our first goal is to analyze the revenue of Nash equilibrium of the proportional
sharing mechanism for general polyhedral environments. We consider a sit-
uation where the system consists of many users having similar demands and
utilities. This is a natural scenario in many systems, such as the internet routing
network and many internet auctions.
Question 1: With symmetry among competing users, what is the
revenue and efficiency of the proportional sharing?
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In Theorem 3.2, we show that both the efficiency and revenue converges to the
optimal if the number of competing users increases.
The bounds on the efficiency and revenue in Theorem 3.2 are quite strong.
But the case when there is no symmetry among users remains an important
question. Although as we will see in Chapter 3, the proportional sharing al-
ways gives a near efficient allocation, the revenue can be very poor. An simple
example is the case of bandwidth sharing game in Figure 1.1, where user 0 has a
linear utility U0(x) =  ·x for a small  and user i’s utility is Ui(x) = x. It is not hard
to see that the proportional sharing described there only creates direct compe-
tition between users i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n and user 0, thus user i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n do not have
incentive to pay high and therefore the revenue is low. For instance, if  = 0,
then at Nash equilibrium, the revenue is 0. Thus, we come to the following
question.
Question 2: How much revenue should we expect to get and how
should we design a mechanism to get a competitive revenue when
there is a lack of symmetry among competing users?
In Chapter 4, we answer this question by introducing a new revenue benchmark
for the general auction setting (Definition 4.2) and show that one can combine
the proportional sharing mechanism with a reserve price scheme to obtain a
constant factor of this revenue benchmark (Theorem 4.4).
Questions 1 and 2 are concerned with the design of mechanisms that do not
have any information on the valuation (utility) of the users. It has been rec-
ognized that in practice, providers try to learn the market demand and charge
different prices for different market segments. This is commonly called price
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discrimination [61]. Price discrimination is studied in many settings, includ-
ing the full information games [59, 60] and asymmetric information games [5].
Price discrimination is usually used to increase the seller’s revenue, the effects
of price discrimination on social welfare, however, are unclear.
We would like to understand this effect of discrimination in proportional shar-
ing in a full information setting. To study this question, we introduce a gener-
alization of proportional sharing mechanism, which we call the weighted propor-
tional sharing mechanism. In this mechanism, each user i is allocated xi = bi∑ j b j Ci,
where the values Ci are decided by strategic providers to increase the revenue.
Our third question is
Question 3: When the provider uses the weighted proportional
sharing mechanism to discriminate among users, how much rev-
enue can the provider get and what is the efficiency loss?
We show that the revenue of the weighted proportional allocation is nearly as
good as the revenue under standard price-discrimination, where provider can
charge different unit prices for different users. For linear user utility functions,
the social welfare at Nash equilibria is at least 1/(1+2/√3) ≈ 0.464 fraction of the
maximum social welfare, and this bound is tight (Theorem 5.4). We extend this
result to a broader class of utility functions and to the case of many providers
(Theorem 5.9).
In the application to sponsored search, our framework gives a different ap-
proach from the the General Second Price (GSP) auctions that is in common use
by search engines. GSP is an algorithm for placing ads to ad-slots, where the
bids of advertisers are multiplied by weights that can be different for different
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advertisers and such weighted bids are used for placing the ads. The larger the
weighted bid, the better the position that the ad gets. The reason to introduce
these weights is explained by the term click-through rates ri j, which is the prob-
ability that users click on ad i when it is placed at position j. It is commonly
assumed that ri j = αi × β j, where αi is the quality of an ad i capturing how rele-
vant the ad is to the search keyword, and β j is the quality of the position: a large
value of β j is associated to a good position among the sponsored links.
The first disadvantage of this approach is that it is possible that in addition
to the ad’s quality, other ads that appear on the same page can affect its click-
through rate (externalities). Thus, αi cannot capture the real click-through rates.
Second, the values αi are given by search engines, it might be the case that these
parameters are also designed strategically to maximize revenue.
The weighted proportional mechanism is studied for general polyhedral en-
vironment, a model that captures an application of sponsored search with com-
plex externalities among ads. Also, in weighted proportional mechanisms, the
weights are decided by profit maximizer providers as an analog to the structure
of the General Second Price auctions.
1.3 Related Literature
Optimal Mechanism in Bayesian Settings Profit maximization in mechanism
design has an extensive history beginning, primarily, with the seminal paper of
Myerson [40] and similar results by Riley and Samuelson[50]. These papers
study optimal mechanism design in Bayesian settings and the solution con-
cept the Bayes-Nash equilibria. In this setting, players’ types are assumed to
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be drawn from commonly known distributions, and each player only knows
about his own type. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile that maps
each player’s type to an actions such that, given this strategy each player max-
imizes their expected payoff over other players’ distributions. In the optimal
auction of Myerson, Riley and Samuelson, players are the bidders and the goal
of the auctioneer is to design a mechanism to maximizes the expected revenue.
This material is by now standard and can be found in basic texts on auction
theory [37, 25].
Prior-free Truthful Mechanism Design The optimal mechanism in Bayesian
settings highly depends on the distributions of bidders’ type. In many applica-
tions, these distributions are hard or impossible to obtain. Prior-free auctions
have recently been of much research focus because of the need for more robust
auctions that do not depend on the underlying distributions of bidders’ valu-
ations.The main constraint in this line of work is to require the mechanism to
be “truthful”, that is, it is best for bidders report their true type regardless what
other bidders do. This approach is considered in economics literature as “detail-
free” or “robust” mechanism design [8]. In computer science the approach was
first considered by [12] and followed by a large literature [14, 16, 15]. The truth-
ful condition is strong, furthermore, this framework does not provide a nice
characterization for the optimal revenue as in the Bayesian setting. The works
in [12, 14, 16, 15] define revenue benchmarks and design mechanisms that ap-
proximate these benchmarks.
Nash Implementation in Full Information Settings This thesis takes a differ-
ent approach from the two lines of research described above. We use the theory
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of Nash implementation in full information settings. In this setting, players
have the complete information about each other. This does not mean that the
designer knows this information. In Chapter 3, 4, we assume that the designer
does not have any information about the users’ utility, he only knows the set
of possible outcomes. The literature on Nash implementation of full informa-
tion games is large, initiated with the seminal work Maskin [33], for which he
won the Nobel prize in 2007. For more on related works in the area, see the
surveys [33, 34, 48, 32]. This literature, however, is mostly concerned about im-
plementation for the goal of maximizing social welfare. This is where this dis-
sertation differs from previous work. We focus on the revenue can be obtained
in Nash equilibria.
Proportional Sharing Mechanism The classical proportional sharing mecha-
nism is introduced and studied by Kelly [24]. There is a large literature studying
various aspects of the proportional sharing mechanism, including robustness,
convergence of response dynamics, efficiency and practicability [62, 13, 55, 22,
20, 18, 30, 49]. Johari and Tsitsiklis [20] show that, when the utilities Ui are con-
cave, then at Nash equilibria the social welfare is at least 3/4 times the social
welfare of the most efficient allocation. The revenue of proportional sharing is
studied by the author with E´va Tardos and Milan Vojnovic´ in [42, 43, 44, 41].
Sponsored Search Auctions Sponsored search is a form of advertising, typi-
cally sold at auctions where merchants bid for positioning alongside web search
results. This is one of the fastest growing, most effective and profitable forms of
advertising, that has attracted researchers in both computer science and eco-
nomics [28, 10, 6, 58, 3]. Our work connects the basic proportional sharing
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mechanisms to the applications of sponsored search. Our framework captures
complex externalities, an important feature of sponsored search auctions.
Mechanism Design with Many Sellers One of our results in this thesis is for
the case of multiple providers. This is an exciting direction in mechanism de-
sign. Mechanism design for multiple providers is complex and not very well
understood. Many standard techniques such as revelation principle fails in this
environment. For more details on recent development of this area see the survey
of D. Martinmort [31] and recent works of M. Pai [45, 46].
Structure of the Thesis
The dissertation has 6 chapters. In Chapter 2 we give some basic notations and
concepts that will be used throughout the thesis, we also describe applications
of the general polyhedral environments. Chapter 3, 4 and 5 give answers to the
three questions discussed at the beginning of this chapter. Chapter 6 concludes
the dissertation with future research directions.
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CHAPTER 2
PRELIMINARIES: BASIC NOTATIONS AND SETTINGS
2.1 Basic Notations
Providers and Users The general resource allocation games we study consist
of multiple providers and users. Providers own the resources and use some types
of mechanisms to allocate the resources to the users. In this thesis, depending
on the context, we sometimes use sellers, auctioneers for providers or buyers, bid-
ders for users. In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, we investigate the case of a single
provider. The general case of many providers is considered in Chapter 5. We
denote by n the number of users in our system.
Allocation Vectors The resource that a user i gets is expressed as a non neg-
ative real value xi indicating the user’s level of activity or allocation. We call ~x
an allocation vector. Usually, providers have limited resources, and the alloca-
tion vectors need to satisfy some constraints. In this thesis, we assume that the
provider knows the set of all possible allocation vectors ~x.
Users’ Utilities Each user has an utility function Ui(xi) on the amount of re-
source xi that he gets. We will assume that all Ui are non negative, monotone
increasing and concave, and Ui(0) = 0. The concavity condition is a traditional
assumption in the literature to capture the diminishing returns property of util-
ities. This is one of the most common assumptions used in economics literature.
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Single Parameter Setting We sometimes focus on a special case of utility func-
tions, namely, linear utilities: Ui(xi) = vixi. In this situation, we call the setting
as single parameter, because each utility can be represented as a single number
vi ≥ 0. We call vi the (private) valuation of user i. In designing a mechanism, we
assume that the provider does not know the valuations of users.
Mechanisms In a mechanism, each user i has a message space Mi to report or
signal to the provider and other users about his type. Based on the reported
messages (m1, ...,mn), mi ∈ Mi from all the users, the provider allocates the re-
source xi and asks for a payment pi from the user i . Thus, ~x, ~p are functions on
the domain ∏ni=1 Mi. We assume that there is also an option for each user not
to participate in the mechanism. This can be encoded as a special ∅ message in
each Mi.
Quasi-linear Payoff In this thesis, we assume users have quasi-linear payoff,
which is the difference between the utility and the payment: Ui(x) − pi.
Nash Equilibrium Nash equilibrium is the solution concept mostly consid-
ered in this thesis. We assume a vector ~m to be a Nash if assuming no other user
want to change their message, it is best for user i to keep his mi to maximize the
payoff, which is Ui(xi) − pi. Because there is a “not participate” option for each
user, at Nash equilibrium, for every user i, we have Ui(xi) ≥ pi.
Dominant Strategy Equilibrium A Nash equilibrium is called dominant
strategy if it is best for each user i to keep his mi no matter how other users
report their messages. Dominant strategy is a stronger solution concept than
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that of Nash equilibrium. It has been showed that every mechanism with dom-
inant strategy equilibrium can be implemented by a mechanism, where each
user report directly their utility, or in the single parameter setting to report their
valuation. This mechanism is called truthful mechanism.
Revenue The revenue of a mechanism is the total payment of all users ∑i pi.
Depending on the solution concepts, one can talk about the revenue of a Nash
equilibrium or of a truthful mechanism.
Social Welfare, Price of Anarchy The social welfare is defined as the total of
users’ utility: ∑i Ui(xi). In quasi linear-payoff model, the social welfare is the
sum of users’ payoffs and the total revenue obtained by the providers. In many
cases, we would like to compare the social welfare at Nash equilibrium with the
optimal social welfare. The ratio between the worst social welfare of a Nash and
the optimal social welfare is call the price of anarchy.
2.2 Polyhedral Environments and Applications
In the following we will describe a general environment that we call polyhedral
environment. This is a general type of constraints on the resources, that capture
a wide range of applications in computer science.
The provider has polyhedral constraints on the resource. That is, the alloca-
tion vector ~x that the provider can allocate needs to be in a convex set of a form
{~x ∈ IRn
+
: A~x ≤ ~1}, where A is a non negative matrix.
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Note that any polyhedron of the form {A′~x ≤ ~c, x ≥ 0}, where A′ is a non
negative matrix and ~c is a non negative vector, can be normalized to the form of
{A~x ≤ ~1, x ≥ 0}.
Network Bandwidth Sharing The most natural example is the bandwidth
sharing game, where each provider owns a network of capacitated links, each
user i is sending traffic along a path Pi and xi is the data transfer rate for user i.
In this case we have a resource constraint associated to each link e: ∑i:e∈Pi xi ≤ ce
where ce is the capacity of link e.
PSfrag replacements
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Figure 2.1: Network bandwidth sharing.
Keyword Auctions The general convex constraints can also capture a gen-
eral model of keyword auctions. This is the main application to be considered
in Chapter 5. The auction is for a single keyword, and there are n advertis-
ers bidding to have their ad appear as a sponsored search result. There are
finite set of outcomes, depending on which bidder gets displayed in which po-
sition. We describe each of these outcomes as a n dimensional vector whose
coordinates are the expected number of clicks that the corresponding adver-
tiser gets. More precisely, let ~x1, . . . , ~xN be all the possible outcome vectors, and
~xk = (xk1, . . . , xkn), where xki is the expected number of clicks that advertiser i re-
ceives at outcome k. To think of keyword auction as a convex resource allo-
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cation, we need to allow randomization in the allocation of bidders to posi-
tions. Choosing between the deterministic allocations by the probability dis-
tribution ~p = (p1, . . . , pN), we have that ∑ j p j ~x j is the vector whose coordi-
nates correspond to the expected number of clicks of an advertiser. Now the
set of expected allocation vectors obtained this way is exactly the convex hull
conv(~x1, . . . , ~xN) = {~x : ~x = ∑ j p j ~x j, p j ∈ [0, 1] for every j and ∑ j p j = 1}. This way
of modeling keyword auctions will be discussed in more details in Chapter 5.
We will show that the convex hull of ~xk can be seen as a special case of our
polyhedral environment under a natural assumption.
Single Parameter Auction Represented by a Downward-closed Set System
This is application will be discussed in more detail in Section 4. In this setting
each agent has a private valuation for receiving service and there is a set system
representing feasible sets. A feasible set is a set of agents that can be served
simultaneously. For example in auction for single item the feasible set system
PSfrag replacements
Single item
Digital goods
General setting
Figure 2.2: General auction setting.
contains singleton. We focus on the typical case of downward-closed environ-
ment where every subset of a feasible set is again feasible. Another example
of such an environment is a combinatorial auction with single-minded bidders,
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where feasible sets correspond to subsets of bidders seeking disjoint bundles of
goods. A more general example is a combinatorial auction with single-value
bidders, each of them has an utility of a single value, vi, when he obtains one of
many possible sets. It will be shown latter that the randomized outcomes of this
environment can be captured by our general polyhedral setting.
Scheduling Jobs in Data Centers This is a problem of allocating data center
resources to users. In this application, typically each user needs to finish a job
which requires reading many different blocks of data across machines in a data
center. Let D ji be the amount of data of type j that job i needs to process and s ji be
the speed that job i can process data of type j. Thus, the time to read this data is
D ji /s
j
i . The finishing time of job i is ti, which is the maximum processing time of
the job across all types of data that it requests. One can consider the model when
each job i tries to maximize the utility Ui(1/ti). Typically, data centers are com-
plex systems consisting of many clusters of machines and data has many copies
across the clusters. The constraints on s ji are complex, but in many cases it can
be captured by convex constraints. Therefore, the allocation vector ~x can also
be captured by convex constraints. In this example, it is unrealistic to design a
mechanism that requires every job to know exactly the complex constraints on
~x. Simple mechanisms are crucial in these applications.
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CHAPTER 3
PROPORTIONAL SHARING FOR POLYHEDRAL ENVIRONMENTS
The fair sharing mechanism was motivated by the need for a simple and easy
to implement mechanism for the resource sharing problem on the Internet. This
mechanism is now quite well studied and has been used to implement many
internet routing protocols. The design of internet congestion control protocols
is based on several ideas varying from using auctions to simple pricing. But
these proposal share the basic goal of maximizing social welfare. The idea is
to implement a simple lightweight mechanism that helps arrange the socially
optimal sharing of resources.
Congestion pricing [23, 53], has emerged as a natural way to decide how to
share bandwidth in a congested Internet. While maximizing social welfare is
important to keep customers subscribed to the system, we believe that revenue
should also be considered. Once a mechanism gets implemented, the network
managers will try to take advantage of the users, and aim to maximize income,
and will no longer only think of the mechanism as a way to arrange the best use
of the network by maximizing social welfare. As a result, it is important that
we also understand the revenue generating properties of the proposed mecha-
nisms.
In this chapter we investigate this question in the context of a proportional
sharing mechanism of Johari and Tsitsiklis [20] that generalizes the fair sharing
for general polyhedral environments. Our main motivation is to study the per-
formance of this mechanism in setting where there is a high symmetry among
competing users. This is a natural assumption, especially in the networking sce-
nario where users are often classified into few categories : “small” or “heavy”
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users, “uploaders” or “downloaders”. Our main question is:
Under a symmetry assumption how the fair sharing mechanism achieve
both goals of revenue and efficiency?
Results We show that with few assumptions, which we will explain more for-
mally in Section 3.2, we can obtain good bounds on both efficiency and social
welfare. We develop a new technique for analyzing such allocation games, and
bound the revenue. Our technique for bounding the revenue uses the similar-
ity between the condition of Nash equilibriums of the game and the dual of a
certain linear program. We show that the game approximately maximizes the
revenue of the auctioneer, with the approximation ratio tending to 1 if play-
ers’ utilities are linear and the number of identical players increases. In a more
general class of utilities satisfying U(2x) > αU(x) for some constant α > 1, the
approximation ratio of the revenue will tend to α − 1. We also strengthen the
efficiency result to show if there are k users of every type than the efficiency is
at least (1 − 14k ) times the social welfare of the most efficient allocation, i.e., the
efficiency tends to the optimal as the number of identical players increases. Our
main theorem can be claimed more precisely as follows:
MAIN THEOREM Given a constant α > 1, and an integer k ≥ 2,
under the assumption that each player’s utility satisfies U(2x) > αU(x)
and for each player type, there are at least k players (defined formally in
section 3.2), the fair sharing mechanism (defined in section 3.1) obtains both
approximately maximum efficiency, and approximately maximum revenue.
The efficiency is at least (1− 14k ) times the optimal efficiency and the revenue
is at least (α − 1)(1 − 1k ) the optimal revenue.
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Remark Note that this bound is very strong when utility is linear (and so α = 2).
For this case we have the revenue of the mechanism is at least f (k) = (1 − 1k )
times the optimal. Already when there are 2 players of each type (when k = 2)
the mechanism achieves 78 times the optimal efficiency and half of the maximum
revenue.
Organization of the Chapter In Section 3.1 we describe the mechanism in the
polyhedral environment. Section 3.2 discusses the bound on the revenue and
the efficiency of this game. Section 3.3 discusses the related literature.
3.1 Proportional Sharing in General Polyhedral Environments
In this section we describe the fair sharing mechanism for the general class of
games introduced in Chapter 2. The mechanism is an extension of the mecha-
nisms introduced by Kelly [23], Johari and Tsitsiklis [20]. Let E denote the set of
constraints (the rows of A). For simplicity of notation, we assume that ue = 1 for
each e ∈ E by normalizing each row. We will use αe to denote the row e of matrix
A, which we will also call constraint e. We now have the following description
of the set of feasible allocations:
∑
i
αei xi ≤ 1 for all e ∈ E, (3.1)
xi ≥ 0.
The Mechanism When sharing a single resource with constraint ∑i xi ≤ 1 the
fair sharing [23] mechanism requires that each player j submits a bid b j, the
amount of money she wants to pay, and the resource is allocated proportional
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to the bids, as x j = b j/
∑
i bi. We can think of
∑
i bi as the unit price p of the good.
The allocation is derived from this unit price, as user j gets x j = b j/p amount for
the cost w j = b j at this price.
To extend this mechanism to a single constraint with coefficients ∑i αixi ≤ 1,
we again require that each player j submit a bid b j, her willingness to pay, and
view p = ∑i bi as the unit price of the good. Recall that αej is the rate at which user
j uses resource e, so user j needs α jx j allocation for a value x j. At the unit price of
p she gets α jx j = b j/p allocation, and hence we need to set x j = b j/(α j p) = b jα j ∑i bi ,
and she will have to pay w j = b j = α jx j p.
For environments with more constraints, Johari and Tsitsiklis [20] extends
the fair sharing mechanism by requiring that users submit bids bej separately on
each resource e. As before, we can view the sum of bids pe = ∑i bei as the unit
price of resource e, and allocate the resource at this price. This allocation limits
the value x j for user j to at most xej = bej/(αej pe). The idea is to ask users to submit
bids bej for each resource e, allocate the resources separately, make user j pay
w j =
∑
e bej, and then set x j = min{e:αej,0} x
e
j.
We need to extend this mechanism to be able to deal with resources that are
under-utilized. Some constraints e may not be binding at any solution, and the
fair sharing method does not deal well with such constraints: users will want
to bid arbitrary small amounts as there is too much of the resource. To deal
with such constraints, we allow each player to request an amount rej without
any monetary bid. For each resource e if the price is 0 (that is pe = ∑i bei = 0) and∑
αei r
e
i ≤ 1 (the requested rates can all be satisfied) then we setting xej = rej for all
j.
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The mechanism can be described formally as follows:
DEFINITION 3.1 (Generalized Proportional Sharing) Each player j submit a
bid bej and a request rej for each resource e. For resource e we use the following allo-
cation:
• If ∑i bei > 0 then xej = b
e
j
αej(
∑
i bei )
for ∀ j
• If ∑i bei = 0 and ∑i αei rei ≤ 1 then xej = rej for ∀ j
• Else, set xej = 0 for ∀ j.
For each player j, the amount of money that she needs to pay is w j = ∑e bej and the final
allocated x j = min{e:αej,0} x
e
j.
Price Taking Strategy Kelly [23] has considered a version of this “game” when
prices are assigned by the network, and users are “price takers” in the sense that
they act to optimize their value at the given prices. We can also view our fair-
sharing game as a pricing game, but in our game the prices are determined as
part of the game. However, it is useful to compare the mechanism above with a
game where players behave as price takers.
Consider an equilibrium of the game, it must be the case that xej = x j for
all resources e that costs money, or otherwise player j can reduce her bid bej
without affecting her allocation. One way to think about the mechanism above
is the following: Players decide on each resource (constraint) a price pe = ∑ j bej;
now players have to pay for each resource e at its unit price pe. To make sure
a player i gets enough of resource e to have a share of xi, he needs αei xi of the
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resource, and hence needs to pay peαei xi for resource e. In order to get all the
needed resources player i must pay a unit price of ∑e αei pe for his resource.
Now, if we assume that the price pe are given, then for each player i the
unit price is fixed. Therefore to maximize her utility, player i will maximize
his utility, that is Ui(xi) − ∑e peαei xi. Taking the derivative in xi to determine the
optimal value for user i we see that user i will choose to buy an xi such that: the
derivative U′i (xi) is equal to the unit price or in the case U ′i (0) is less than the unit
price, she will choose not to buy any resource. We rewrite this as follow:
U′i (xi) =
∑
e
αei p
e OR xi = 0 if U′i (0) <
∑
e
αei p
e. (3.2)
Condition for Nash Equilibriums In our mechanism, the prices pe are not
fixed. They are the sum of all the bids on each constraint, which are given
by strategic players. As a result, the Nash condition given below is slightly
different from (3.2). In the allocation game, the price is a function of the bids,
and this induces the players to “shade” their bid for the resource, getting a bit
less resource at a smaller price. Johari and Tsitsiklis [20] prove that a Nash
equilibrium exists and give the following conditions. In this condition, observe
that the differences between the Nash condition (3.3) and the condition (3.2) are
the terms 1(1−αej x j) . We will show later that using the competitiveness condition
(defined in Section 3.2), these terms are small.
THEOREM 3.1 ([20]) If the utility function of each player is increasing, differentiable
and concave, then there always exists a Nash equilibrium.
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An allocation x a bid and a request vector b, r is a Nash solution if and only if:
∑
i α
e
i xi ≤ 1; xi ≥ 0 for all e ∈ E ,
U′j(x j) =
∑
e
peαej
(1−αej x j)
, if x j > 0 or (3.3)
x j = 0 if U′j(0) ≤
∑
e peαej; where pe =
∑
i bei .
Proof. To simplify the presentation, and without loss of generality, we will as-
sume that each resource e has at least two dedicated users who only needs re-
source e, and who have small, but linear utility x. These users will guarantee
that no resource is under-utilized, but will not change either the optimal alloca-
tion of the Nash equilibrium substantially. Using this assumption, we can never
have ∑i bei = 0 for any resource e. To get the result we need to take the limit as
the rate  of the utility of the extra users tends to 0 (see [20]).
Next we analyze the condition for an equilibrium for this game. We will use
these conditions to show that an equilibrium always exists. Consider a set of
bids bei , and a resulting allocation x, where player i gets allocation xi. When is
this allocation at equilibrium? For each resource e we use pe = ∑i bei , the sum of
the bids, as the unit price of the resource (recall that we normalized constraints,
so there is 1 unit of every resource available).
Now consider the optimization problem of a player j assuming bids bei for
all other players are set. The player j is interested in maximizing her utility at
U j(x j) − ∑e bej. At equilibrium, it must be the case that xej = x j for all resources e
that costs money, or otherwise player j can reduce her bid bej without affecting
her allocation. So we can think of the player’s optimization problem as depen-
dent on one variable x j, the allocation she will receive. What bid does player j
have to submit for a resource e to get allocation xej = x j? Bids must satisfy the
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following condition:
If bej > 0 then: αej x j =
bej∑
i bei
.
Assuming all other bids bei are fixed, we can express the bid bej needed as follows.
bej(x j) =
αej x j
∑
i, j bei
1 − αej x j
.
Note that this expression assumes that α jx j < 1, that is, j is not the only user
of the resource at equilibrium. It is not hard to see that this is guaranteed by
having at least two dedicated users for each resource.
User j will want to choose x j to maximize her utility. For this end, it will
useful to express the derivative of the bid bej when viewed as a function of x j.
We get the following (again assuming α jx j < 1):
∂
∂x j
bej(x j) =
αej
∑
i, j bei
(1 − αej x j)2
.
Substituting ∑i, j bei = pe(1 − αejx j) and simplifying we get that
∂
∂x j
bej(x j) =
peαej
1 − αejx j
.
Now consider the optimization problem of player j. She wants to maximize
her utility U j(x j) −∑e bej, which can now be expressed as
U j(x j) −
∑
e
αejx j
∑
j,i bei
1 − αejx j
,
as a function of the single variable x j. Note that this is a concave function of
x j. The maximum occurs at a value x j, where the derivative of this function 0,
or if the derivative is negative everywhere, maximum occurs at x j = 0. Using
the derivatives we computed above, we get the derivative of user jth utility as
a function of her allocation x j to be
U′j(x j) −
∑
e
peαej
(1 − αejx j)
.
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This derivative is a strictly decreasing function, so we have the following
Nash condition:
∑
i α
exi ≤ 1; xi ≥ 0 for all e ∈ E
U′j(x j) =
∑
e
peαej
(1−αej x j)
, if x j > 0 or
x j = 0 if U′j(0) ≤
∑
e peαej; where pe =
∑
i bei .
To see that there is always a Nash equilibrium, observe the game we de-
fine above is a concave n-person game: each payoff function is continuous in
the composite strategy vector ~bi, and the strategy space of each user is a com-
pact, convex, nonempty subset of R|E|. Applying Rosen’s existence theorem [51]
(proved using Kakutani’s fixed point theorem), we conclude that a Nash equi-
librium w’ exists for this game.
By this, we finished the proof.
3.2 Revenue and Efficiency of Proportional Sharing
In this section we analyze the revenue and efficiency of a Nash equilibrium.
In the rest of the section we will use the variable x as a solution of the Nash
condition (3.3). To evaluate the outcomes of the game x, we will compare the
social welfare and the revenue with the optimal social welfare, which can be
written as an optimum of the following a linear program. In this program to
avoid using x as a solution of (3.3), we use new variable zi for the amount of
resource that buyer i gets.
max OPT =
∑n
i=1 Ui(zi)
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subject to ∑i αei zi ≤ 1; ∀e ∈ E (3.4)
zi ≥ 0.
We denote z∗ as a solution of the program above. We have OPT = ∑i Ui(z∗i ).
As already mentioned in the introduction, we need to make two assump-
tions to be able to get a reasonable bound on the revenue. First we assume
that the players’ utility functions grow at a reasonably steady rate. Second, we
assume that there are at least k ≥ 2 players of each type.
DEFINITION 3.2 (ASSUMPTION(α, k)) The two assumptions are
• Growing Utilities: The utility function U j(x) of all users j is non negative,
increasing, differentiable, concave, further, Ui satisfies: Ui(2x) ≥ αUi(x) for some
α > 1.
• Competitiveness: We say that the type of a player j is her utility function U j(x)
and the rate at which she needs the resources, the coefficients αej for all resources e.
We assume that there are at least k players of every type: that is for every player
j, there are at least (k − 1) other players with the same type.
In the context of bandwidth sharing, the second assumption means that for
each player j, there are at least k − 1 other players with the same utility function
and the same path.
The main result of the chapter is the following:
THEOREM 3.2 Under Assumption(α, k), the mechanism defined in section 3.1 ap-
proximately maximizes both efficiency and revenue. The loss of efficiency is bounded by
a fraction of 14k and the revenue is at least (α − 1)(1 − 1k ) times the optimal revenue.
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We prove this theorem in the rest of the section (by Theorem 3.7 and The-
orem 3.11). We first introduce an Linear Program Duality technique and give
some intuitions about this approach in the next subsection.
3.2.1 The Primal Dual Approach
The condition for Nash equilibriums can be intuitively understood as if there
were a common price pe on each constraints and for each buyer i the unit price
that he needs to pay is the weighted sum of these prices with the coefficients αei .
At Nash equilibrium, xi = 0 if U′i (0) is less than
∑
e α
e
i p
e, otherwise U′i (xi) can be
approximated by this weighted sum. If we consider the prices pe as variables
then this condition on pe is similar to the complementary slackness condition
of a certain linear program. Using this observation, we consider the following
linear program and its dual, where x is a given an Nash equilibrium.
PRIMAL max ∑i U′i (xi)zi
subject to: ∑αei zi ≤ 1; zi ≥ 0. (3.5)
DUAL min ∑i ye
subject to: U′i (xi) ≤
∑
αei ye; y
e ≥ 0. (3.6)
LEMMA 3.3 (Weak Duality) Given a zi and ye feasible solutions for the Primal and
the Dual program respectively, we have: ∑e ye ≥ ∑i U′i (xi)zi.
To prove the bound on the revenue, we observe that the price vector pe of a
Nash satisfying the condition (3.3) almost satisfies the condition of the DUAL
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program. The extra terms 11−αei xi in the Nash condition can be bounded by a con-
stant. Furthermore, the convex program of maximizing social welfare is similar
to the PRIMAL program. The difference between these programs is the objec-
tive function. And it will be shown later that using the growing property of
the utility functions, these two objective functions are close to each other. Thus,
with the duality lemma, we can get a connection between a the revenue of a
Nash equilibrium and the optimal social welfare.
To prove the bound on the efficiency, based on the Nash condition, we will
introduce new game on each constraint. The bound on the efficiency of each of
these separated games is much easier to check.
3.2.2 Bound on the Revenue
We now prove that the revenue at a Nash equilibrium is at least (α − 1)(1 − 1k ) of
the optimal. As mentioned before we use the optimal social welfare as an upper
bound on the revenue. Recall that we use z∗ as an allocation maximizing the
social welfare. To compare the revenue ∑e pe with ∑i Ui(z∗i ), we first show that
pe
1− 1k
is feasible for the Dual program (3.6) and therefore:
∑
e
pe
1 − 1k
≥
∑
i
U′i (xi)z∗i ,
because z∗ is clearly feasible for the Primal program (3.6). Next, using the grow-
ing property of the utility functions, we prove that
∑
i
U′i (xi)z∗i ≥ (α − 1)
∑
i
Ui(z∗i ).
Combining these two inequalities, we obtain:
∑
e
pe
1 − 1k
≥ (α − 1)
∑
i
U(z∗i )⇒
∑
e
pe ≥ (α − 1)(1 − 1k )OPT,
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which is what we need to prove.
In order to show that p
e
1− 1k
is feasible, we first observe that the equilibrium is
not know to be unique in the general, however, players of identical type must
get identical allocation:
LEMMA 3.4 If two players i and j have the same type, then in any Nash equilibrium,
they get the same allocation.
Proof. By the Nash equilibrium conditions (3.3) both xi and x j are 0 if U′i (0) =
U′j(0) <
∑
i α
e
i p
e and otherwise both are the unique solutions equation of Nash
in (3.3). (The function on the left hand side of (3.3): U ′j(x j) is a decreasing func-
tion, meanwhile the function on the right hand side ∑e peαej1−αej x j is an increasing
function.)
We now can prove the following lemma:
LEMMA 3.5 pe1− 1k is feasible for the Dual program.
Proof. Since for every buyer i there are other k − 1 buyers of the same type,
and due to Lemma 3.4, these buyers get identical allocation. Therefore, for each
constraint e, we have 1 ≥ ∑ j αejx j ≥ kαei xi. Thus αei xi ≤ 1k , and hence 11−αei xi ≥ 11− 1k .
From this and the Nash condition we have: U ′i (xi) ≥
∑
e α
e
i p
e 1
1−αei xi
≥
∑
e α
e
i p
e 1
1− 1k
. This shows that pe1− 1k is feasible for the Dual program (3.6).
We now prove the second inequality needed for bounding the revenue:
LEMMA 3.6 ∑i U′i (xi)z∗i ≥ (α − 1) ∑i Ui(z∗i ) = (α − 1)OPT .
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Proof. The objective function of the primal linear program and the social maxi-
mizing program are ∑i U′i (xi)zi and ∑i Ui(zi), respectively. To compare these two
functions at z∗, we use the tangent line Vi(zi) of the utility function at x defined
as Vi(zi) = U′i (xi)zi + (Ui(xi) − U′i (xi)xi). This is a line going through (xi,Ui(xi)) and
is above Ui(zi) as Ui is a concave function. See Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: The shape of the utility functions.
Observe that for each i the function f (zi) = U′i (xi)zi could be smaller than the
function Ui(zi), but using the function Vi at z∗i we get:
U′i (xi)z∗i + Ui(xi) − U′i (xi)xi ≥ Ui(z∗)⇒ U′i (xi)z∗i ≥ Ui(z∗) − (Ui(xi) − U′i (xi)xi).
And summing this over all i:
∑
i
U′i (xi)z∗i ≥
∑
i
Ui(z∗)−
∑
i
(Ui(xi)−U′i (xi)xi)) = OPT −
∑
i
(Ui(xi)−U′i (xi)xi). (3.7)
Now, we need to get a bound on ∑i(Ui(xi)−U′i (xi)xi). To do that we will need
the growing property of the utility functions. Because Ui is concave function
U′i (xi) is decreasing. We have:
Ui(2xi) − Ui(xi) =
∫ 2xi
xi
U′i (t)dt ≤
∫ 2xi
xi
U′i (xi)dt = U′i (xi)xi.
Using the assumption Ui(2x) ≥ αUi(x), we obtain:
U′i (xi)xi ≥ Ui(2xi) − Ui(xi) ≥ (α − 1)Ui(xi).
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Now because Ui are concave and Ui(0) = 0 ∀ i, we have Ui(xi) ≥ U′i (xi)xi.
Thus we obtain from the previous inequality:
0 ≤ Ui(xi) − U′i (xi)xi ≤ (2 − α)Ui(xi).
Summing over i, we get a bound on the difference between the objective func-
tion of the program (3.4) and the program (3.5) at x as follow:
0 ≤
∑
i
(Ui(xi) − U′i (xi)xi) ≤ (2 − α)
∑
i
Ui(xi).
However, z∗ is an optimal solution of (3.4), therefore 0 ≤ ∑i Ui(xi) ≤ ∑i Ui(z∗i ).
Thus combining with the previous inequality we have:
0 ≤
∑
i
(Ui(xi) − U′i (xi)xi) ≤ (2 − α)
∑
i
Ui(z∗i ) = (2 − α)OPT. (3.8)
Combining (3.7) and (3.8) we have:
∑
i
U′i (xi)z∗i ≥ OPT − (2 − α)OPT = (α − 1)OPT.
This is indeed what we need to prove.
Thus, as discussed before, combining Lemma 3.5 and Lemma 3.6 with the
Duality lemma, we have proved the following theorem:
THEOREM 3.7 Under the assumption (k, α), the revenue that a Nash equilibrium
achieves is at least (α− 1)(1− 1k ) the optimal revenue that any other mechanism can get.
3.2.3 Bound on the Efficiency
We next prove the bound on the efficiency of the mechanism. Our result in this
subsection is a generalization of the Johari and Tsitsiklis bound [20]. Using the
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assumption that there are at least k players of each type, we can improve the
bound on the efficiency to 1− 14k . In the special case when k = 1, we get a simple
proof of the 3/4 bound of Johari and Tsitsiklis.
To prove this bound, we first use the same argument used in [20] to assume
that it is enough to consider the case where all the utility functions are linear
(Lemma 3.8). For the case of linear utility functions, we use the Nash condition
(3.3) to defined a separate proportional sharing game on each constraint. The
bound of efficiency for these special cases can be checked easily (Lemma 3.10).
We begin with the technical lemma used in [20] to simplify the utility func-
tions.
LEMMA 3.8 [20] Given an instance of the game with the concave utility Ui, and let
x be solution satisfying the Nash condition. Consider the game where the utility Ui
is replaced by the function Wi(z) := U′i (xi)z. The allocation x still satisfies the Nash
condition in the new game and the ratio between social welfare at Nash and the optimal
does not increase.
Proof. We first modify the utility function Ui to the linear function Vi with the
slope U′i (xi) such that Vi(xi) = Ui(xi). That is Vi(z) = U′i (xi)(z−xi)+Ui(xi)). See figure
3.2. Because the derivative of the new utility function at xi does not change,
therefore x still satisfies the Nash condition of the new game. Furthermore, the
social welfare of the solution x stays the same. On the other hand, because Ui
is concave, thus Vi(z) ≥ Ui(z) ∀z, therefore the new optimal social welfare can
only increase. As a result, in the modified game, the ratio between Nash and
Optimal social welfare does not increase.
Next we consider new utilities Wi obtained by shifting Vi to the origin. That
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is Wi(z) = U′i (xi)z. The difference between Vi and Wi is a constant. Let c be the
sum of these differences over all i. If the N and O are respectively the Nash
and the optimal social welfare of the game with utility Vi, then the Nash and
optimal social welfare of the game with utility functions Wi are N − c and O − c,
respectively. Since we know N ≤ O and 0 ≤ c ≤ min{N,C}, we have
N
O ≥
N − c
O − c ,
which shows that the ratio also decreases. By this we finished the proof.
The next lemma gives the bound on the efficiency of a simplest case.
LEMMA 3.9 Under Assumption(α, k) the fair-sharing mechanism for the simple re-
source sharing problem ∑i xi ≤ 1 obtains a solution with the social welfare at least
(1 − 14k ) times the optimal.
Proof. Due to Lemma 3.8, it is enough to consider the special case of pure linear
utility functions Ui(x) = aix for every players i.
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The maximum social welfare is the optimum of ∑i aixi where ∑i xi ≤ 1. Thus
it is equal to OPT = maxi ai. Let’s assume that a1 = maxi ai. From the Nash
condition
U′i (xi) = ai =
p
(1 − xi) if xi > 0,
one obtains the following. If xi > 0, then ai > p and a1(1 − x1) = p, and thus if
xi > 0 then ai > a1(1 − x1).
By Assumption(α, k), in the original game there are at least k players who have
the same utility function as player 1 and hence they get the same allocation x1
by Lemma 3.4. These players provide a total utility that is at least ka1x1 and all
other players fill out the bandwidth of 1, so they have total share of 1 − kx1 and
have utility coefficients ai ≥ a1(1 − x1). This gives us a total utility of at least
∑
i
aixi ≥ ka1x1 + a1(1 − x1)(1 − kx1).
Hence the ratio between social welfare at the Nash equilibrium x and the opti-
mum one is
∑
i aixi
a1
≥ ka1x1 + a1(1 − x1)(1 − kx1)
a1
= 1 − x1 + kx21.
This expression is minimized when x1 = 1/(2k) when the ratio is 1 − 1/(4k) as
claimed.
The lemma can be easily extended to the single resource sharing problem
∑
i αixi ≤ 1 where the optimal revenue is maxi ai/αi.
LEMMA 3.10 Under Assumption(α, k) the fair-sharing mechanism for the single re-
source sharing problem ∑i αixi ≤ 1 obtains a solution with the social welfare at least
(1 − 14k ) times the optimal.
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We are now ready to prove the following theorem
THEOREM 3.11 Under Assumption(α, k) the ratio between social welfare at Nash
and the optimal one is at least 1 − 14k .
Proof. As discussed before, we will consider separate games for each resource
e. Consider a Nash equilibrium x. As before we can assume without loss of
generality that the utility function is linear Ui(x) = aix for all players, as was
shown in Lemma 3.8. We use ai = U′i (xi).
Consider the Nash condition (3.3):
U′j(x j) =
∑
e
peαej
(1−αej x j)
, if x j > 0 and
U′j(0) ≤
∑
e peαej if x j = 0.
We will consider a separate game for each resource e. In the game corre-
sponding to resource e player i is interested in getting an allocation zei with the
constraint ∑ j αej xej ≤ 1, and a linear utility function vei xei , where vei = αei pe(1−αei xi) . If
we set xei = xi then by (3.3) the allocation vector xe forms a feasible allocation at
equilibrium, with total utility ∑i vei xei .
We want to apply Lemma 3.9 for each resource e. To be able to do this,
we need to see that the new game also satisfies Assumption(α, k). To see why,
note that players of identical type will also have identical vei values (as identical
players get the same allocation) and hence remain of identical type in the new
game.
Now by Lemma 3.10, the social welfare of each game e at Nash is at least
(1 − 14k ) times the optimal one for the edge.
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Now, due to condition (3.3) of Nash equilibrium, ∑e vei is equal to U′i (xi) when
xi > 0, and
∑
e v
e
i ≥ U′i (xi) otherwise. Therefore for all allocations z we have
∑
e
∑
i
vei zi =
∑
i
zi
∑
e
vei ≥
∑
i
U′i (xi)zi.
Maximizing each edge separately using ∑i zivei and summing all the maxima we
get a no smaller maximum than maximizing ∑i U′i (xi)zi over all feasible alloca-
tions. Therefore Lemma 3.10 implies that the overall efficiency is at least a (1− 14k )
fraction of the maximum possible.
3.3 Related Literature
Proportional sharing discussed here was first studied in the context of commu-
nication networks by Kelly [23]. The explicit formulation of the Nash equilib-
rium is given by Johari and Tsitsiklis [20]. The efficiency result is due to Johari
and Tsitsiklis [20]. The excellent survey of Johari [19] contains many references
to other related works in the area.
Most of the new results in this chapter, such as the efficiency bound for the
case of symmetric users and the revenue performance of proportional sharing
are given by the author and Tardos in [42].
The fact that properties of some systems improve as the number of users
increases has been previously considered in other settings. Edgeworth [11] con-
siders an exchange economy, where users come to the market with a basket of
goods and aim to exchange the goods to maximize their utility. He was com-
paring the concept of Walrasian competitive equilibrium to the notion of the
core in this setting. For an exchange economy a competitive allocation is an al-
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location resulting from market clearing prices p, where all players sell at price
p and use the resulting money to buy their optimal set of goods. The core of
the exchange economy game is an allocation of goods where no subset of users
can re-contract using their initial allocation to improve at least one user’s util-
ity without decreasing the utility of any of them. It is not hard to see that all
competitive allocations are in the core of the exchange game, but in general
the core has other allocations that are not supported by prices. Edgeworth [11]
showed that with two different players if the market contains many copies of
each player, the set of core allocations converges to the competitive allocation as
the number of players grows. More generally, the core in exchange economies
with many (small) players is known to converge to the competitive allocations,
see Anderson [4] for a survey.
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CHAPTER 4
REVENUE MAXIMIZATION FOR GENERAL SINGLE-PARAMETER
AUCTIONS
In the previous chapter we consider the proportional sharing mechanism for a
general polyhedral setting, and prove a revenue bound of the mechanism with
the symmetry assumption among competing users. The revenue in this setting
was compared with the optimal social welfare. The goal of this chapter is to
relax the assumption of symmetry among competing users. We will consider a
special case where all utility functions are linear Ui(xi) = vixi.
The first problem we face is that, without the symmetry assumption, maxi-
mum social welfare is too strong to use as an upper bound of the revenue. To
see this, consider an auction for an unit of a divisible resource, and we assume
that there is a “big” user with a much higher valuation than others. In order to
get a revenue that is competitive with optimal social welfare, the social welfare
of the outcome has to be large also, because social welfare is an upper bound of
the revenue. Thus, we need to assign most of the resource to the big user, even
if he significantly misrepresents his valuation. And hence, we cannot expect to
extract his valuation as income. A more rigorous argument is analyzed in [44].
In the auction for single item described above, the second highest valuation
among vi is considered as a simple and natural benchmark for the revenue. In
a different setting, the case of digital good auction (e.i there is an unlimited
supply of good), Goldberg et al. [12] introduce a benchmark called F 2 and give
a mechanism obtaining a revenue at least a constant fraction of the benchmark.
Extending these benchmarks for more complex settings is an open problem.
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The general setting is usually called general single parameter auction [15]. In
this problem, each agent has a private valuation for receiving service and there
is a set system representing feasible sets. See Figure 4.1. A feasible set is a set of
agents that can be served simultaneously. For example in single good the feasi-
ble set system contains singletons. We focus on the typical case of downward-
closed environment where every subset of a feasible set is again feasible. An-
other example of such an environment is a combinatorial auction with single-
minded bidders, where feasible sets correspond to subsets of bidders seeking
disjoint bundles of goods.
PSfrag replacements
Single item
Digital goods
General auction
Figure 4.1: General auction setting described by a set system.
As discussed in Chapter 1, if we consider randomized outcomes in this set-
ting, then the feasible allocation can be captured by a polyhedral. This can be
stated as follows.
LEMMA 4.1 The set of randomized outcomes of the general single parameter auction
can is the set of non negative vectors ~x = (x1, .., xn) satisfying
A~x ≤ ~1, ~x ≥ ~0, where A is a non negative matrix.
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We omit the proof of this claim in this chapter. A proof for a similar result can
be found in the next chapter (Lemma 5.1).
The main goal of this chapter is
Define a natural revenue benchmark and design a mechanism to obtain com-
petitive revenue against this benchmark in general auction environments.
Contribution We introduce a new revenue benchmark for the general single
parameter auction and give a mechanism obtaining a revenue within a constant
factor of this benchmark. Our new benchmark is the generalization of the sec-
ond valuation in single item auctions and the F 2 benchmark of digital good
auctions. The main idea of our mechanism is to combine the general propor-
tional sharing mechanism with the truthful mechanism for digital good of [12]
to yield a competitive mechanism for the introduced benchmark.
Structure of the Chapter In Section 4.1 we formally define the benchmarks
F 2 and our extension for general settings. In Section 4.2 we review the auction
for digital good and introduce our mechanism for the setting of an arbitrary
downward-closed set system. We show that the mechanism generates at least
a constant fraction of the new benchmark. Related work is discussed in Sec-
tion 4.3.
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4.1 Wost-case Revenue Benchmarks
The approach for prior-free mechanism design is to design an auction that is
always (in worst case) within a small constant factor of some profit benchmark.
We first need to define the profit benchmark we will be attempting to compete
with. In the following we will discuss some wost-case benchmarks. Starting
with the simplest case of auction for single item, we then discuss the bench-
mark for the case of digital good auction introduced in Goldberg et al. [12], and
in a way of combining these two cases, we introduce a generalization of these
benchmarks for the general setting of set system .
Single Item
The most simplest auction setting is the case of auctions for single item. It is well
known that both first price and second price auctions give the same revenue,
which is the second largest valuation. We use the second valuation because it is
a simple and intuitive benchmark for single item auction.
Digital Good
For digital goods auctions, the good are in unlimited supply. One can think of
natural profit benchmarks, such as (a) the maximum profit achievable with fully
discriminating prices (where each bidder pays their valuation) or (b) the maxi-
mum profit achievable with a single price, are provably too strong in the sense
that no truthful auction can be constant competitive with these benchmarks.
Thus, the profit benchmark we will use is the following:
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DEFINITION 4.1 ([12]) The optimal single priced profit with at least two winners is
F 2(v) = maxi≥2iv(i),
where v(i) is the ith largest valuation.
In this chapter we also use the notaion
F (v) = maxiiv(i).
General Setting
From the benchmarks of the two special cases above, we observe that in the
single item auction we have a full competition among bidders, on the other
hand, when the good is in unlimited supply, it is necessary to use some type of
reserve price to obtain high revenue. In the general case of downward closed
set system, one can think of the setting as the combination of the two extreme
cases above. If one can partition the set of bidders into two set N1 and N2, where
N2 is a set of bidders that can be served simultaneously, while the bidders in
group N1 need to compete with each other and with N2 for the limited resource.
From N2, we use the revenue benchmark of F 2(N2). From N1 we can get at most
the maximum social welfare of this group of bidders, denoted by SocialOpt(N1).
See Figure 4.2. For each partition, one obtains a benchmark for the revenue, thus
taking the minimum over all partitions, we can define the following benchmark.
DEFINITION 4.2 (Benchmark R)
R = min
N1,N2
SocialOpt(N1) + F 2(N2),
where N = N1]N2 is a partition the bidders, such that N2 can be served simultaneously.
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Figure 4.2: A revenue benchmark for downward closed set systems.
Remark This benchmark gives exactly the second valuation in the single item
auction and the F 2 benchmark in the digital good auction. Note that the rev-
enue that we would like to obtain from N2 is the maximal social welfare, there-
fore, in order to design a mechanism obtaining a constant factor of R, we cannot
fix the partition before running the mechanism. We will see later that the parti-
tion is part of the outcome of the mechanism.
4.2 The Mechanisms
We now discuss two mechanisms that generate a revenue at least a constant
factor of the benchmarks introduced in the previous section. The first one is a
truthful mechanism from [12] for the case of digital good. The second one is a
combination of proportional sharing and this truthful mechanism. The second
mechanism uses the solution concept of Nash equilibrium.
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4.2.1 Truthful Mechanism for Digital Good Auctions
In the following, we review the auction of Goldberg et al. [12], which gives
a revenue at least 1/4 of the benchmark F 2. The main idea is to randomly
partition the set of bidders into 2 groups, calculate the optimal profit can be
obtained by single price in each part, and use the revenue obtained in one group
as a “revenue goal” for the other group. To make this more precise, consider the
following mechanism.
DEFINITION 4.3 (ProfitExtract(R) [12]) The digital goods auction profit extractor
with target profit R sells to the largest group of k bidders that can equally share R and
charges each R/k.
It is straightforward to show that ProfitExtract(R) is truthful and obtains a profit
of R when F (b) = maxiiv(i) ≥ R.
With this definition, we are now ready to define the following truthful mech-
anism, called The Random Sampling Profit Extraction auction.
DEFINITION 4.4 (RSPE [12]) The Random Sampling Profit Extraction auction
(RSPE) works as follows:
(i) Randomly partition the bids b into two by flipping a fair coin for each bidder and
assigning her to b′ or b′′. Compute R′ = F (b′) and R′′ = F (b′′), the optimal
profits for each part.
(ii) Run ProfitExtract(R′) on b′′ and ProfitExtract(R′′) on b′.
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The intuition for this auction is that ProfitExtract(R) allows us treat a set of
bidders, b, as one bidder with bid value F (b). The RSPE auction randomly
partition the set of bidders and intuitively treat them as two bidders with valu-
ations R′ = F (b′) and R′′ = F (b′′). Thus the profit of RSPE is min(R′,R′′). In the
following we will show that this value is at least 1/4 of the benchmark F 2.
THEOREM 4.2 ([12]) The competitive ratio of RSPE is 4.
Proof. As we discussed above, the profit of RSPE is min(R’,R”). Thus, we just
need to analyze E[min(R′,R′′)]. Assume that F 2(b) = kp has with k ≥ 2 winners
at price p. Of the k winners in F 2, let k′ be the number of them that are in b′
and k′′ the number that are in b′′. Because there are k′ bidders in b′ at price p,
R′ ≥ k′p. Likewise, R′′ ≥ k′′p. Thus,
E[RS PE(b)]
F (2)(b) =
E[min(R′,R′′)]
kp ≥
E[min(k′p, k′′p)]
kp =
E[min(k′, k′′)]
k ≥
1
4
.
The last inequality follows from the fact that if k ≥ 2 fair coins (corresponding
to placing the winning bidders into either b’ or b”) are flipped then
E[min{#heads, #tails}] =
bk/2c∑
i=0
i ·
(
k
i
)
1
2k
≥ k
4
.
The equality occurs when k = 2.
4.2.2 Nash Implementation for the General Setting
We now give a mechanism whose revenue at Nash equilibrium is within a con-
stant factor of the Benchmark R.
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The Main Idea In order to obtain a constant factor of the benchmark R, we
need to combine two important features of the mechanisms for single good and
digital good described above. Recall that in the case of single item auction, we
have a full competition among bidders, on the other hand, for the digital good,
we need to use a version of reserve prices.
In the general case, we will first use the proportional sharing mechanism
introduced in the previous chapter as a version of creating competition among
bidders, after this we will give additional resources to bidders for extra money.
After the proportional sharing mechanism, we consider the bidders who get
a large share of resources, which we call big bidders. The intuition is that there
is a lack of competition among these bidders, and therefore, we can use the
mechanism designed for the benchmark F 2 for the big bidders.
The idea seems to be quite simple: attach a truthful mechanism after a pro-
portional sharing mechanism. There are, however, several issues. Because the
second mechanism is run on the outcome of the first mechanism, bidders might
behave differently from the case where the two mechanism are run separately.
There are two main issues.
First, the second phase of the mechanism is run only for the set of big bidders
who get large share of the resource in the first round, therefore, it might be the
case that the small bidders will overbid in the first round to get to the second
one. Thus, the property of a Nash equilibrium in proportional sharing might
be not valid. For example, the game in this case might not have a pure Nash
equilibrium.
Second, it is also possible that the large bidders will either increase or lower
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their original bids in the first round to change the set of bidders that survive to
the second round, and thus the price of the second mechanism might be differ-
ent and better for him.
To overcome the first difficulty, we modify the paying scheme in the second
round of the mechanism. The price that a bidder needs to pay is the maximum
of the two values: the price obtained in the second round and a price related to
the price that the bidder pays in the first round. By doing this we make sure
that if the small bidders overbid in the first round, they still need to pay a large
money in the second round, and their payoff will be negative if he does so. We
define formally the modified version of RSPE (Definition 4.4) as follow.
DEFINITION 4.5 (RSPE*(~p)) Input: a given price pi for each bidder i. Let bi be the
bid from bidder i.
(i) Randomly partition the bids b into two by flipping a fair coin for each bidder and
assigning her to b′ or b′′. Compute R′ = F (b′) and R′′ = F (b′′), the optimal
profits for each part.
(ii) Find the largest group of bidders among b′ that can equally share the profit (R′′),
the number of these bidders is k′. Charge bidder i max{R′′k′ , pi}.
Find the largest group of bidders among b′′ that can equally share the profit (R′),
the number of these bidders is k′′. Charge bidder i max{ R′k′′ , pi}.
To overcome the second difficulty, we will slightly change the proportional
sharing such that at an equilibrium, if a bidder gets a large share of the resource,
then by bidding differently from the equilibrium, he cannot benefit in the sec-
ond round of the mechanism.
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To make it more precise, consider the simple case of sharing an unit of a
single resource. We would like to modify the proportional sharing such that
the following is true. Consider the set of bidders who get at least c fraction
of the resource at a Nash equilibrium, if any of these bidders lowers his bid, he
will get less than c, furthermore, he cannot change the set of the big bidders by
over bidding. Note that this condition does not hold in traditional proportional
sharing because by overbidding a bidder can change the price of the resource
and other bidders will get less resource. To this end, we introduce the following
mechanism called Truncated Proportional Sharing (TPS).
DEFINITION 4.6 (TPS(c)) The Truncated Proportional Sharing mechanism is for
the resource constraint ∑i αixi ≤ 1, and an upper limit c is the following.
Each bidder i bids bi. Let
b∗i =

bi if biαi·∑ j b j ≤ c,
b such that b
αi·(b+∑ j,i b j) = c if
bi
αi·∑ j b j > c.
The allocation for bidder i is
xi = min
c,
b∗i
αi ·
∑
j b∗j
 .
The payment for bidder i is bi.
As the name of the mechanism suggests, the Truncated Proportional Sharing
mechanism above is a modified version of traditional proportional sharing,
where the resource is truncated by c, and the bid bi is also truncated by a value
at which bidder i gets c fraction of the resource. Thus, we can see that at a Nash
equilibrium, no bidder i bids more than b∗i , furthermore, if he bids less than b∗i ,
then xi < c and he cannot change the set of big bidders by bidding more than b∗i .
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Now because at a Nash equilibrium, bi = b∗i , to analyze the Nash equilibria,
we can see this game as a proportional sharing game discussed in Chapter 3.
Observe that the resource that each bidder i can get is min
{
c, bi
αi·
∑
j b j
}
. This is
exactly description of the game where each bidder has two constraints xi ≤ c
and ∑i αixi ≤ 1. Thus with the argument above and applying the basic result of
Theorem 3.1, we obtain the following.
LEMMA 4.3 Assuming the valuation of bidder i is vi, there is a Nash equilibrium of
the mechanism TPS and the condition for the equilibria is the following
bi = b′i for all i, and let p =
∑
i
bi,
∑
i
αixi ≤ 1; 0 ≤ xi ≤ c for all i,
vi =
pαi
(1 − αixi) , if 0 < xi < c ,
vi ≤ pαi(1 − αixi) , if xi = 0 ,
vi ≥
pαi
(1 − αixi) , if xi = c .
Furthermore, if bidder i gets c fraction of the resource, then by increasing his bid, he
does not influence other bidders’ strategies and by lowering his bid, he gets less than c
fraction of the resource.
We are now ready to define our main mechanism, called Two-Phase Mecha-
nism.
DEFINITION 4.7 (TPM(c1, c2)) The Two-Phase Mechanism is for a general polyhe-
dral environment of the form A~x ≤ ~1, each constraint (row) e of A is ∑αei xi ≤ 1. The
mechanism uses the parameters c1, c2, where c12 < c2 < c1 < 1. These parameters will be
chosen later to optimize the revenue bound. The mechanism consists of two phases:
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(i) Run proportional sharing for the environment 1c1 · A~x ≤ ~1, but use the Truncated
Proportional Sharing TPS(c2) on each constraint. At Nash equilibrium, we obtain
an allocation vector and a price pe on every constraint e and the bid vector ~b at
Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Let pi = 1−c1c1−c2 ·
∑
e α
e
i p
e. Run RSPE*(~p) (Definition 4.5) (but scaled down the bids
by 1− c1, because bidders will get at most 1− c1 in this round) on the bidders that
obtained c2 in the first round.
The main result in this chapter is the following.
THEOREM 4.4 Given an arbitrarily small , there are proper parameters c1, c2 such
that the revenue at Nash equilibrium of the mechanism TPM with these parameter is at
least R14+ , where R is the benchmark defined in Definition 4.2.
Before proving this theorem, we first derive a condition for a Nash equilibrium.
As described above, we will consider the first phase of the mechanism as if there
were no second round. We then claim that this condition also holds for Nash
equilibrium of the extended game with the second round. The precise statement
is the following.
LEMMA 4.5 Let 0 ≤ αei be the entries of the matrix A that describes the resource con-
straints A~x ≤ ~1. User i’s utility is vixi. Consider the mechanism TPM in Definition 4.7.
An allocation ~x a bid vector ~b of the first round is in a Nash solution if and only if:
∑
i α
e
i xi ≤ c1 for all e ∈ E
0 ≤ xi ≤ c2 for all i
v j ≥
∑
e pe
αej/c1
(1−αej x j/c1)
, if x j = c2;
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v j ≤
∑
e peαej/c1 if x j = 0;
v j =
∑
e pe
αej/c1
(1−αej x j/c1)
, if 0 < x j < c2,
where pe = ∑i bei .
Proof. It is straight forward to see that the condition above if the condition of
a Nash equilibrium without the second phase of the mechanism. The proof is
exactly the same as the proof of Theorem 3.1.
We now need to see that with the second round, a Nash equilibrium of the
first round is still a Nash equilibrium of the extended mechanism.
For the small bidders, we will show that if he increases his bid in Nash equi-
librium to get c2 unit of resource to enter the second round the unit price that
he needs to pay is larger than his valuation. Because we know that xi = 1 is a
feasible solution, thus αei ≤ 1 for all i, e. Observe that if 0 ≤ xi < c2, then
vi = pe
∑
e
αej/c1
(1 − αejx j/c1)
≤ pe
∑
e
αej/c1
(1 − c2/c1) =
1
c1 − c2
∑
e
peαei
Now, if bidder i increases the bids, pe will also increase, and because in the
second round, the price per unit is at least 1c1−c2
∑
e peαei for bidder i. Thus, bidder
i cannot benefit from overbidding.
Because of Lemma 4.3, if a big bidder decreases his bid, he will get less than
c2 and will not be able to enter the second round and he would not increase the
bid either, because by doing so, he will need to pay more, but cannot affect the
strategies of any other bidders.
We now show a lemma which bounds the revenue obtained in the first round
with the optimal social welfare of the smaller bidders.
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LEMMA 4.6 Let N0 be the set of bidders whose valuation vi ≤ 1c1−c2
∑
e peαei . Let N1 be
the set of bidders obtaining less than c2, then we have N1 ⊂ N0 and
∑
e
1
c1 − c2
pe ≥ max
z≥0:Az≤1
∑
i∈N0
vizi ≥ max
z≥0:Az≤1
∑
i∈N1
vizi.
Proof. Similar to the prove above, for 0 ≤ xi < c2, we have
vi = pe
∑
e
αej/c1
(1 − αej x j/c1)
≤ pe
∑
e
αej/c1
(1 − c2/c1) =
1
c1 − c2
∑
e
peαei .
This shows that N1 ⊂ N0. To show the inequality, we use the duality theorem.
max
z≥0

∑
i
vizi : Az ≤ 1
 ≤ minw≥0

∑
e
we :
∑
e
weαei ≥ vi
 .
Recall that αei are the entries of matrix A. Applying this duality lemma, in our
case we = pec1−c2 . Thus, we have
∑
e
1
c1 − c2
pe ≥ max
z:Az≤1
∑
i∈N0
vizi.
We are now ready to prove our main theorem.
Proof of Theorem 4.4 The mechanism in the first round gives us a partition of
the bidders into N1 and N2, where N2 is the set of big bidders, who get c2 >
c1/2 fraction of the resource, and N1 is the set of the remaining bidders (small
bidders). Let ~y be an allocation vector of the first round and ~z of the second
round of the mechanism. Let R1,R2 be the expected revenue obtained in the first
and second round, relatively.
We first show that the large bidders form a feasible set, that is, they can be
served simultaneously. Recall that an allocation needs to satisfy xi + x j ≤ 1,
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whenever bidder i and j cannot be served together. In the first round of the
mechanism, we scaled the resource down by c1, therefore, if an allocation vector
~y satisfies yi + y j > c1, then i, j can be served simultaneously. We choose the set
N2 to be the bidders who get c2 > c1/2, therefore, N2 is a feasible set.
Next, we show that the final allocation vector (~y+~z) is feasible, that is A(~y+~z) ≤
~1. In the first round we have that A~y ≤ ~c1. The second round allocates resource
to the bidders in N2. As shown above that N2 is a feasible set. This means that
the allocation vector ~1N2 , which corresponds to servicing all the bidders in N2,
satisfies A~1N2 ≤ ~1. However, in the second round of our mechanism, we allocate
to each bidder at most 1 − c1, therefore, A~z ≤ (1 − c1)~1. From this we have
A(~y +~z) ≤ ~1, which we need to show.
Finally, we prove an lower bound on the revenue of our mechanism. Ac-
cording to Lemma 4.6, the revenue obtained in the first round is at least
R1 ≥ (c1 − c2) max
z:Az≤1
∑
i∈N2
vizi.
Therefore,
R1
c1 − c2
≥ SocialOpt(N1). (4.1)
In the second round of the mechanism we run a mechanism to subtract F 2
revenue benchmark for the bidder N2 (scaled by 1 − c1). Using Theorem 4.2,
one would expect to have R21−c1 ≥
F 2(N2)
4 . However, the mechanism we use in the
second round is slightly different from the mechanism RSPE of Definition 4.4.
The bidder i’s payment for 1 − c1 of the resource is the maximum of the price he
would need to pay in the original RSPE mechanism scaled by 1 − c1 and 1−c1c1−c2 ·∑
e α
e
i p
e. Therefore, we would get 0 revenue from bidder i with vi < 1c1−c2 ·
∑
e α
e
i p
e.
However, according to Lemma 4.6, we have that R1c1−c2 is at least the optimal social
55
welfare of these bidders, hence if we would have a weaker inequality as follow
R1
c1 − c2
+
R2
1 − c1
≥ F
2(N2)
4
. (4.2)
Thus, combining (4.1) and (4.2), we have
5
c1 − c2
R1 +
4
1 − c1
R2 ≥ SocialOpt(N1) + F 2(N2).
We choose c1 = 5/7, c2 = 5/14 + ′, where ′ is positive but negligible, one have
5
5/14 − ′R1 +
4
2/7
R2 ≥ SocialOpt(N1) + F 2(N2).
Thus for any  > 0, we can choose  ′ > 0 such that
(14 + )(R1 + R2) ≥ SocialOpt(N1) + F 2(N2).
This is what we need to prove.
4.3 Related Literature
The main new result in this chapter are in [41]. The benchmark and mechanism
for digital good are from the work of Goldberg et al. [12].
Profit maximization in mechanism design has an extensive history begin-
ning, primarily, with the seminal paper of Myerson [40] and similar results by
Riley and Samuelson [50]. These papers study Bayesian optimal mechanism
design. This material is by now standard and can be found in basic texts on
auction theory [37, 25].
Worst-case benchmark approach was first introduce by Goldberg et al. [12],
and is followed by many others. This type of mechanism is now commonly
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called prior-free mechanism design. For more details on this line of work see
the recent papers [16, 15] and the survey [14].
Mechanism design via Nash equilibrium implementation in full information
settings has a large literature in economics, started with the seminal paper of
Maskin [33], see the recent survey [34, 48] and the citations therein.
Proportional sharing mechanism and its extension for networks is intro-
duced ans studied in [24, 18, 20, 21]. Most of these works study the social
welfare of the system. The work presented in this thesis and the related pa-
pers [42, 43, 44, 41] study the revenue of this class of mechanisms.
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CHAPTER 5
WEIGHTED PROPORTIONAL SHARING AND KEYWORD AUCTIONS
In this chapter we study the weighted proportional sharing mechanism. This is
a natural extension of the classical proportional sharing studied in Chapter 3,
that provides a framework to analyze the incentives of revenue maximizing
providers. In weighted proportional sharing, providers will decide different
weights on each user. This type of mechanisms in principle is similar to the the-
ory of price discrimination in economics literatures. To motive our questions in
this chapter, we first explain the price discrimination frameworks in traditional
Bayesian mechanism design and in sponsored search applications.
Price Discrimination Price discrimination [56, 57], or price differentiation, ex-
ists when sales of identical goods or services are transacted at different prices
from the same provider. In communication and information technology mar-
kets different types of discrimination pricing is critical for sellers [54, 7]. Price
discrimination has been considered in many settings. The case of full informa-
tion games is considered by Varian [59, 60], that assumes that each market has a
demand function and the monopoly charges different unit prices on each mar-
ket to maximize the revenue. The question considered by Varian is the effect of
this discrimination pricing scheme on the social welfare.
Price Discrimination in Sponsored Search In sponsored search auctions, the
winning bidders are not the firms with the highest per-click bids: advertisers are
ranked on the basis of the product of the their bid and a factor that is something
like an estimated click-through rate. The rough motivation for this is straight-
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forward: weighting bids by their click-through rates is akin to ranking them on
their contributions to search-engine revenues (as opposed to per-click revenues
which is a less natural objective) [28, 6, 58, 10]. However, there are two issues.
First, it is not clear that one can use a single scale as in click-through rates model
to capture that ad’s quality. This is because other ads that appear on the same
page can affect an ad’s quality (called externalities). Second, because the click-
through rates are given by the search engines. One wonders if these weights are
affected by strategic actions of auctioneer to maximize the revenue in the same
principle as the discrimination pricing framework.
Our Question Motivated by this line of research, in this chapter we study a
simple version of price discrimination for proportional sharing. We introduce the
weighted proportional sharing mechanism, which is a natural generalization of
the traditional proportional sharing mechanism studied in Chapter 3. In this
mechanism, each user i is allocated
xi =
wi∑
j w j
Ci,
where Ci is a value decided by strategic providers. This new class mechanisms is
simple to describe to users, and more suitable for resources with general convex
constraints as users use the resources at different rates. Our question is
When provider uses the weighted proportional sharing mechanism to dis-
criminate among users, how much revenue can the provider get and what
is the efficiency loss?
Our Results The results in this chapter can be summarized as follows.
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Revenue: The revenue of the weighted proportional allocation is at least k/(k+ 1)
times the revenue under standard third-degree price-discrimination with a set
of k users excluded. In a third-degree discrimination pricing scheme, a provider
can impose different unit prices for different users to maximize the revenue.
The maximum revenue in this case is max ∑i U′i (xi)xi over ~x ∈ P. Compared with
this benchmark, the traditional proportional sharing mechanism can have arbi-
trarily small revenue. We also note that comparing revenue of a mechanism to a
maximum revenue obtained by other optimal pricing scheme where some users
do not participate has been widely used in the mechanism design literature, see
for example [14]. Here we establish a general theorem in this line of work on
revenue maximizing mechanisms.
Efficiency: For linear user utility functions, the social welfare is at least 1/(1 +
2/
√
3) ≈ 0.464 times the maximum social welfare, and this bound is tight. We
extend this result by introducing a broad class of utility functions, we call δ-
utility functions (δ is a non-negative parameter), and show that this class of
utility functions contains many families of utility functions found in literature.
For example, a linear or truncated linear utility function as well as log(1 + x),
some polynomials and some families of utility functions commonly considered
in the network resource allocation belongs to this class with δ ≤ 2. We also show
that a utility function from this class remains in the class by multiplying with
any positive constants and that sums of utility functions from this class remain
in the class. We then show that if the utility functions are δ-utility functions,
then the social welfare is at least 1/(1 + 2/√3 + δ) times the maximum social
welfare.
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Organization of the Chapter We first discuss the sponsored search auction
used and some of the drawbacks of the current model in Section 5.1. We then
describe the weighted proportional sharing game in an arbitrary polyhedron as
an alternative approach for this problem in Section 5.2. The revenue gain, the
price of anarchy of this mechanism and the environment with many providers
will be studied in the Section 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 relatively. The related literature is
discussed in Section 5.6.
5.1 Sponsored Search Applications
In the keyword auctions for sponsored search, the general second price (GSP)
mechanism is in common use by search engines. GSP is an algorithm for placing
ads to ad-slots, where the bids of advertisers are multiplied by weights that can
be different for different advertisers and such weighted bids are used for placing
the ads. The larger the weighted bid, the better the position that the ad gets. The
reason to introduce these weights is explained by the term click-through rates
ri j, which is the probability that users click on ad i when it is placed at position
j. It is commonly assumed that ri j = αi × β j, where αi is the quality of an ad
i capturing how relevant the ad is to the search keyword, and β j is the quality
of the position: a large value of β j is associated to a good position among the
sponsored links.
This commonly used approach has two important issues. First, it is possi-
ble that in addition to the ad’s quality, other ads that appear on the same page
can affect its click-through rate (externalities). Second, it is not clear what the
real connection is between the weights assigned to each advertiser and the ads’
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quality αi, as the search engine might strategically assigns these weights to max-
imize the revenue.
Externalities in keyword auctions are natural and important, for example,
the valuation of a bidder for being, say, in position 2 depends on what ad is
showed in position 1. For example, NIKE in position 1 makes position 2 less
valuable for sneakers compared to having an unknown brand name in position
1.
Polyhedral Environments for Keyword Auctions
The general polyhedral framework can be used to captured a very general de-
pendency among click-through rates. The model can be described as follow.
The auction is for a single keyword, and there are n advertisers bidding to
have their ad appear as a sponsored search result. There are finite set of out-
comes, depending on which bidder gets displayed in which position. We de-
scribe each of these outcomes as a n dimensional vector whose coordinates are
the expected number of clicks that the corresponding advertiser gets. More pre-
cisely, let ~x1, . . . , ~xN be all the possible outcome vectors, and ~xk = (xk1, . . . , xkn),
where xki is the expected number of clicks that advertiser i receives at outcome
k. To think of keyword auction as a convex resource allocation, we need to al-
low randomization in the allocation of bidders to positions. Choosing between
the deterministic allocations by the probability distribution ~p = (p1, . . . , pN), we
have that ∑ j p j ~x j is the vector whose coordinates correspond to the expected
number of clicks of an advertiser. Now the set of expected allocation vectors
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obtained this way is exactly the convex hull
conv(~x1, . . . , ~xN) = {~x : ~x =
∑
j
p j ~x j, p j ∈ [0, 1] for every j and
∑
j
p j = 1}.
In this model, we will assume a natural condition on the externalities of the
click-through rates: if we remove an ad from a position (by simply showing one
fewer ad), the expected number of clicks received by the remaining ads does
not decrease. Under this assumption, it is not hard to see that the set of all
possible randomized allocation vectors, that is the convex hull conv( ~x1, . . . , ~xN),
can be written as {~x : A~x ≤ ~1, where A ≥ 0}, which is exactly the constraint of the
problem considered in this thesis. This statement can be formulated as follow.
We say that the a resource allocation problem with a feasible set of alloca-
tions P in IRn
+
satisfies the assumption of non-positive externalities if for any alloca-
tion ~x ∈ P, and any coordinate k, there is an allocation ~x′ ∈ P such that (1) x′k = 0,
and (2) xi = 0 implies x′i = 0, and x′i ≥ xi for all i , k.
LEMMA 5.1 The convex hull of some non-negative vectors ~x1, . . . , ~xN that satisfy the
assumption of non-positive externalities can be written as {~x ∈ IRn
+
: Ax ≤ ~1}, for a non
negative matrix A.
Proof. Let C be the convex hull of ~x1, . . . , ~xN . We will show that if these vectors
satisfy the assumption of non-positive externalities, then for a vector ~w ∈ C, and
any vector ~v such that 0 ≤ ~v ≤ ~w is also in C. With this property, it is not difficult
to see from basic convex geometry that the set C can be written as a polyhedron.
We prove this property by induction on the number of non-zero coordinates
of ~w. The claim is trivial when wi = 0 for every i. Consider a vector ~w ∈ C.
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The set C is the convex hull of ~x1, . . . , ~xN , hence there exist non-negative real
numbers α1, . . . , αN such that
∑
i αi = 1, and ~w =
∑
i αi
~xi. Let k be the coordinate
that minimizes the ratio vi/wi for wi , 0, and let λ denote this ratio. By definition,
λ ≤ 1, and thus if λ = 1, there is nothing to prove. We use the definition of non-
positive externalities for each ~xi to obtain a vector ~zi ∈ C with zik = 0, and let
w′ =
∑
i αiz
i. Consider the vector λ~w + (1 − λ)~w′ ∈ C. By definition of λ, we have
the following facts
• ~w′ ∈ C;
• ~w′ has more zero coordinates than ~w (namely the kth coordinate);
• the kth coordinate of λ~w + (1 − λ)~w′ is equal to vk;
• λ~w + (1 − λ)~w′ ≥ ~v (as ~w′j ≥ ~w j for all coordinates j , k);
• λ~w ≤ ~v which follows as λ was the minimum ratio mini vi/wi.
The last two properties guarantee that there is a vector 0 ≤ ~v′ ≤ ~w′ such that
λ~w+ (1−λ)~v′ = ~v. Now, we use the induction hypothesis to ~w′ ∈ C and 0 ≤ ~v′ ≤ ~w′
to show that ~v′ ∈ C, and hence, ~v = λ~w + (1 − λ)~w′ ∈ C.
5.2 Weighted Proportional Mechanism
The weighted proportional allocation game is defined as a two-stage Stackel-
berg game as follows. The provider first announces a set of discrimination
weights ~C = (C1, . . . ,Cn), then users submit bids ~w = (w1, · · · ,wn). The alloca-
tion to each user i is given by xi = Ciwi/
∑
j w j. In this game, each user i chooses
a bid wi that maximizes the surplus Ui(xi) − wi. The provider, however, could
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predict the Nash outcome, which will be shown to be unique, and he selects the
discrimination weights ~C that maximize the revenue R = ∑ j w j with the condi-
tion that the resulting Nash allocation vector is feasible, i.e. ~x ∈ P. Note that this
condition is only required for the allocation at Nash equilibrium.
Given a discrimination weight Ci and the sum of the bids
∑
j w j, each user i
selects a bid wi that maximizes his surplus, i.e. solves
USER: maximize Ui
(
wi∑
j,i w j + wi
Ci
)
− wi over wi ≥ 0. (5.1)
Under the assumed behavior of users, one can analyze the Nash equilibrium
of the game. It turns out that a Nash equilibrium exists and is unique, and at
Nash equilibrium the relation between revenue and allocation is captured by an
implicit function. This is stated in the following lemma.
LEMMA 5.2 Given discrimination weights ~C, there is a unique allocation correspond-
ing to the unique Nash equilibrium. Vice versa, given an allocation ~x, there is a weight
~C such that ~x is the corresponding outcome. Furthermore, the corresponding revenue
R(~x) is a function of ~x given by
∑
i
U′i (xi)xi
U′i (xi)xi + R(~x)
= 1. (5.2)
Proof. We have
xi = Ci
wi∑
j w j
(5.3)
and the user’s problem can be written as
USER: maximize Ui
(
wi∑
j,i w j + wi
Ci
)
− wi over wi ≥ 0. (5.4)
Note that the objective function in (5.4) is concave in wi, hence, at an optimum
solution either wi = 0 or the derivative of the objective function is zero. Setting
65
the derivative to zero is equivalent to:
U′i (xi) · Ci
∑
j,i w j
(∑ j w j)2 = 1, for xi > 0.
It follows
U′i (xi) =
(∑ j w j)2
Ci
∑
j,i w j
=
R2
Ci(R − wi) (5.5)
where recall the revenue is equal to the sum of the payments by individual
users, i.e. R = ∑ j w j. Combining with wi = xiR/Ci that follows from (5.3), we
have
U′i (xi) =
R
Ci − xi
⇔ CiU′i (xi)(1 −
xi
Ci
) = R. (5.6)
Now, ∑ xiCi = 1, thus, condition (5.6) is exactly the condition for maximizing
∑
i
∫ xi
0
CiU′i (ti)
(
1 − tiCi
)
dti over xi ≥ 0, subject to
∑ xi
Ci
= 1.
Since
∫ xi
0 CiU
′
i (ti)
(
1 − tiCi
)
dti is a strictly concave function with respect to xi, there
exists a unique Nash equilibrium.
It remains to show that for an equilibrium allocation ~x, the revenue R is given
by ∑
i
U′i (xi)xi
U′i (xi)xi + R
= 1. (5.7)
From (5.6), we have
U′i (xi) =
R
Ci − xi
=
R
xi(Ci/xi − 1) ⇒
Ci
xi
− 1 = R
U′i (xi)xi
⇒ xiCi
=
U′i (xi)xi
U′i (xi)xi + R
.
Combining with ∑i xi/Ci = 1 which follows from (5.3), we obtain (5.7). Note
that all the formulas above are applied for the case xi > 0 only; nevertheless,
if xi = 0, we have U′i (xi)xi = 0, and therefore, the equation (5.7) holds for any
optimum allocation vector ~x.
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Lastly, to show given an allocation ~x, there is a weight vector ~C, such that
~x is the corresponding outcome, we note that in equilibrium, discrimination
weights ~C and bids ~w are functions of the equilibrium allocation ~x given in the
following, for every i,
Ci = xi +
R(~x)
U′i (xi)
and wi =
R(~x)
U′i (xi)xi + R(~x)
U′i (xi)xi.
By this we finished the proof of the lemma.
The revenue maximizing problem of the provider using a weighted propor-
tional sharing can be written as follows
PROVIDER: maximize R(~x) over ~x ∈ P,where R(~x) is given by (5.2). (5.8)
5.3 Revenue
In this section, we prove a guarantee on the revenue obtained by our mecha-
nism. Consider the standard third-degree price discrimination scheme [56, 57]
where the provider can impose different unit prices for different users. If pi
is the unit price for user i, then the user’s pay-off maximization problem is
max Ui(xi) − pixi over xi ≥ 0. Thus, U′i (xi) = pi, and therefore, the total revenue
maximization problem of the provider is max ∑i U′i (xi)xi over ~x ∈ P. However,
in revenue maximization mechanism design, comparing with such a benchmark
is too ambitious. Instead, we will use the optimal revenue of this scheme in a
system where some users do no participate. Namely, let R∗n−k be the optimum
revenue obtained by the third-degree price discrimination scheme when an ar-
bitrary set of of k users is excluded. More formally,
R∗n−k = minS⊂{1,...,n}: |S |=n−k max~x∈P
∑
i∈S
U′(xi)xi.
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Our main result in this section is the following theorem.
THEOREM 5.3 Suppose that for each i, U ′i (x)x is a concave function. Let R be the
optimum revenue of the weighted proportional allocation mechanism, then for all 1 ≤
k < n,
R ≥ kk + 1R
∗
n−k.
Proof. Let R(~x) be the value of R satisfying (5.2). From (5.2) it is easy to get the
following
∑
i
U′i (xi)xi −maxj U
′
j(x j)x j ≤ R(~x) <
∑
i
U′i (xi)xi, for all ~x ∈ P.
Suppose that for each 1 ≤ k < n, there exists ~x ∈ P such that both of the following
two conditions hold
(i) ∑i U′i (xi)xi ≥ R∗n−k;
(ii) U′1(x1)x1 = · · · = U′k+1(xk+1)xk+1 ≥ · · · ≥ U′n(xn)xn,
where, without loss of generality, the users are enumerated such that U ′1(x1)x1 ≥
· · · ≥ U′n(xn)xn. Under conditions (i) and (ii), the theorem is followed because
R(~x) ≥
∑
i
U′i (xi)xi −maxj U
′
j(x j)x j ≥
k
k + 1
∑
i
U′i (xi)xi ≥
k
k + 1R
∗
n−k.
We show that such ~x exists by induction over k. Base step: k = 0. The vector ~x
that maximizes ∑i U′i (xi)xi over ~x ∈ P satisfies both conditions.
Induction step: Let ~x ∈ P be a vector such that both condition (i) and condi-
tion (ii) hold for k. We then show that there exists another vector in P such that
these conditions hold for k + 1. Note that R∗n−k ≥ R∗n−(k+1) as allowing to exclude a
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larger set of users cannot increase R∗n−k. In the following, without loss of gener-
ality, we assume that users are enumerated such that U ′1(x1)x1 ≥ · · · ≥ U′n(xn)xn.
Let ~y ∈ P be an optimum solution of the provider’s problem under price taking
users and the constraint y1 = . . . = yk+1 = 0, i.e. with users 1, 2, . . . , k+1 excluded.
We have that ∑i U′i (yi)yi ≥ R∗n−(k+1).
Now, let us consider the vector ~v(t) defined by
~v(t) = (1 − t) · (U′1(x1)x1, . . . ,U′n(xn)xn) + t · (U′1(y1)y1, . . . ,U′n(yn)yn), for t ∈ [0, 1].
Note that as t increases from 0, the k+1 largest coordinates of~v(t) decrease, while
all the other coordinates either increase or do not change. Thus, there exists
t∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that the largest k + 2 coordinates of ~v(t) are equal. Furthermore,
as ∑i U′i (xi)xi ≥ R∗n−(k+1) and ∑i U′i (yi)yi ≥ R∗n−(k+1), we have that ∑i vi(t∗) ≥ R∗n−(k+1).
Finally, since for each i, U ′i (xi)xi is concave, there exists a vector ~z ∈ P such
that (U′1(z1)z1, . . . ,U′n(zn)zn) = ~v(t∗). By this, we showed that the vector ~z satisfies
conditions (i) and (ii) for k + 1 which completes the proof.
5.4 Price of Anarchy
In this section, we analyze the efficiency of the system for the case of single
provider and linear user utility functions. This provides us with basic tech-
niques for a more general result established in the next section. In particular,
we prove the following theorem.
THEOREM 5.4 Assume that for each user i, the utility function is linear, Ui(x) =
vix, for some vi > 0. Then, the worst-case efficiency is 1/(1 + 2/
√
3) (approx. 46%).
Furthermore, this bound is tight.
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Before proving the theorem, note that the worst-case efficiency can be
achieved asymptotically as the number of users n tends to infinity. One ex-
ample is when we have the resource constraint ∑i xi ≤ 1, and there is a unique
user with largest marginal utility, say this is user 1, all other users have identical
marginal utilities equal to (2 − √3)2v1 ≈ 0.0718v1. At the Nash equilibrium, user
1 obtains 42.26% of the resource and the rest is equally shared by the remain-
ing users. Thus, the efficiency loss occurs only when there is an unbalance in
the marginal utilities by the users. One can actually show that when there is
a higher competitiveness among the users, the efficiency increases. More pre-
cisely, in Theorem 5.6, we show that if there are at least k users with the largest
marginal utilities, then the efficiency is at least 1 − 12k + o(1/k).
Recall that R(~x) is the function given by (5.2). Let R∗ be the optimum revenue,
i.e. R∗ = max{R(~x) : ~x ∈ P}. We have the following observation.
LEMMA 5.5 The set Lµ := {~x ∈ IRn+ : R(~x) ≥ µ} is convex, for every µ ∈ [0,R∗].
Proof. We want to show that Lµ := {~x ∈ IRn+ : R(~x) ≥ µ} is convex, where
∑
i
vixi
vixi + R(~x) = 1.
It is clear that R(~x) is a monotone increasing function in each xi, therefore if ~y ≥ ~x,
and ~x ∈ Lµ, then also ~y ∈ Lµ.
It is enough to see that given ~x and ~y such that R(~x) = R(~y) = µ then for every
other vector~z on the interval connecting ~x and ~y we have R(~z) > µ. See Figure 5.1.
Since R(~z) is a monotone function in each zi, it is enough to prove that
∑
i
vizi
vizi + µ
≥ 1.
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Figure 5.1: Convexity of the revenue.
Assume ~z = α~x + (1 − α)~y. Since the function vizivizi+µ is concave for every i, we
have
vizi
vizi + µ
≥ α vixi
vixi + µ
+ (1 − α) viyi
viyi + µ
.
Summing over i, we obtain the desired inequality.
We now give the proof for Theorem 5.4.
Proof of Theorem 5.4. The example showing the bound is tight is given in the
remark above; we now prove that the efficiency is at least 1/(1 + 2/√3).
Since for every ~x ∈ P, R(~x) ≤ R∗, the two convex sets LR∗ and P do not have
common interior points. Let H be a hyperplane that weakly separates these two
sets. This hyperplane can be written as
∑
i
γixi = 1, with γi ≥ 0 for each i. (5.9)
Consider the game where the provider has the feasible set Q = {~x ∈ IRn
+
:
∑
i γixi ≤
1}, then the allocation that maximizes the revenue over Q is the same as in the
original game. Since P ⊂ Q, the optimal social welfare of the new game is at
least the social welfare of the original game. Therefore, it is enough to prove
a lower bound on the efficiency for the class of games where the provider has
the feasible set Q. See Figure 5.2. The observation above allows us to reduce
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Figure 5.2: Reduction to a simple constraint.
the analysis to simpler optimization problems. In particular, the optimal social
welfare in this new game is maxi vi/γi; the condition for Nash equilibrium, as
argued above, is the condition for the optimal point of R(~x) over ∑i γixi = 1, for
which we can derive to a simple form as follow. Taking the partial derivative
with respect to x j on both sides in (5.2), with Ui(xi) = vixi, we have
∂
∂x j
∑
i
vixi
vixi + R
= 0⇔ ∂
∂x j
v jx j
(v jx j + R) −
∑
i, j
∂R
∂x j
v jxi
(vixi + R)2 = 0.
Noting that
∂
∂x j
v jx j
v jx j + R
=
Rv j
(v jx j + R)2 −
∂R
∂x j
v jx j
(v jx j + R)2 ,
Thus, we have
Rv j
(v jx j + R)2 =
∂R
∂x j
·
∑
i
vixi
(vixi + R)2 .
Now, because R(~x) achieves the optimum value R∗ over the set {~x ∈ IRn
+
:
∑
i γixi ≤
1}, we have either x j = 0 or ∂∂x j R = λγ j where λ ≥ 0 is a parameter (the Lagrange
multiplier associated to the constraint ∑i γixi ≤ 1). It follows that
either xi = 0 or
vi/γi
(vixi + R∗)2 =
λ
R∗
∑
i
vixi
(vixi + R∗)2 = p > 0. (5.10)
By this, we obtain a condition that at the Nash equilibrium allocation vi/γi(vi xi+R∗)2
are equal to a common value p. Therefore, if vi/γi is large then the denominator
(vixi + R∗)2 needs to be large as well. At the same time, the optimal solution of
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social welfare distributes all the resource to the user with the highest vi/γi. This
is the intuition for the fact that the efficiency is bounded by a constant.
First we will rescale the variables to make the equations easier to follow. We
will use a new set of variables, namely zi = γixi, and ai = vi/γi. One way to
think about this new variables is to think of another game where the resource
constraint is ∑i zi = 1 and user i’s utility is aizi. Without loss of generality, we as-
sume that a1 = maxi ai. The optimal social welfare is OPT = max~x:∑i γi xi=1
∑
i vixi =
max~z:∑i zi=1
∑
i aizi = a1.
We now introduce new variables yi = vixi/(vixi + R∗) = aizi/(aizi + R∗). Because
of (5.2), we have ∑i yi = 1. The goal of introducing these variables is to bound the
optimal social welfare and the social welfare of a Nash equilibrium as functions
of yi. Now, from yi = aizi/(aizi + R∗), we have
aizi = R∗
yi
1 − yi
and zi = R∗
yi
ai(1 − yi) .
Next, we are going to bound the social welfare of a Nash equilibrium and the
optimal solution.
NASH (the social welfare of a Nash equilibrium) can be bounded using the relations
above as follow
NAS H =
∑
i aizi = R∗
∑
i
yi
1−yi ≥ R∗
( y1
1−y1 +
∑
i≥2 yi
)
= R∗
( y1
1−y1 + (1 − y1)
)
= R∗ y
2
1−y1+1
1−y1 . (5.11)
The above inequality uses the fact that yi1−yi ≥ yi and
∑
i yi = 1.
OPT (the optimal social welfare), as argued above, is maxi ai = a1. To bound a1 as a
function of yi, we multiply a1 with
∑
i zi, which is 1, and use the relation between
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zi and yi to have OPT as a function of yi. More precisely,
OPT = a1 = a1(
∑
i
zi) = a1R∗
∑
i
yi
ai(1 − yi) . (5.12)
Now, we use the condition for Nash equilibrium. (Note that this is the only
place in the proof that uses (5.10).) First we rewrite the condition for the vari-
ables zi, ai. Replacing ai = vi/γi and vixi = aizi = R∗ yi1−yi in to the condition for
Nash equilibrium (5.10), we can derive
either yi = 0 or
ai(1 − yi)2
R∗2
= p > 0.
From this condition, we have ai(1 − yi)2 = a1(1 − y1)2 whenever y1, yi > 0, hence
ai(1 − yi) = a1(1−y1)
2
1−yi . Replacing this equality in the optimal social welfare (5.12),
we have
OPT = a1R∗
∑
i
yi
ai(1 − yi) =
R∗
(1 − y1)2
∑
i
yi(1 − yi) ≤ R
∗
(1 − y1)2
y1(1 − y1) +
∑
i≥2
yi
 .
The last inequality uses the fact that yi(1 − yi) ≤ yi. Using this and replacing∑
i≥2 yi = 1 − y1, we obtain
OPT ≤ R
∗
(1 − y1)2 (y1(1 − y1) + 1 − y1) = R
∗ 1 − y21
(1 − y1)2 . (5.13)
From (5.11) and (5.13), the efficiency is at least (y21 − y1 + 1)/(y1 + 1). By a simple
calculus, one can show that this ratio is at least 1/(1 + 2/√3), which is what we
need to prove.
THEOREM 5.6 Admit same setting as in Theorem 5.4 and, in addition, assume that at
Nash equilibrium the largest users get at most 1/k unit of resource. Then, the efficiency
is at least 1 − 12k + o(1/k).
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Proof. Following the same steps as in the proof of Theorem 5.4, we have that
the social welfare at the Nash equilibrium is at least
ky
1 − y + (1 − ky)
and the maximum social welfare is at most
1
(1 − y)2 (ky(1 − y) + 1 − ky)
for some 0 ≤ y ≤ 1/k. It follows that the efficiency is at least
fk(y) = (1 − y)
(
2 − y
1 − ky2 − 1
)
for some 0 ≤ y ≤ 1/k. It remains only to establish that
inf
y∈[0,1/k]
fk(y) = 1 − 12k + o(1/k).
This follows by noting that for a minimizer y, f ′k (y) = 0, which is equivalent to
y4 − 5k y
2
+
2
k
(
2 +
1
k
)
y − 2k2 = 0.
Since y ≤ 1/k, we neglect the term y4 as it is of smaller order than other terms,
which amounts to solving a quadratic equation whose solution in [0, 1/k] is
given by
y =
1
5
2 + 1k −
√
4 − 6k +
1
k2
 .
It readily follows that y = 12k + o(1/k) and plugging into fk(y) yields the asserted
claim.
5.5 Multiple Providers
In this section we will extend the results to the case of multiple competing
providers, and a broad class of utility functions. We first define the framework
for multiple providers.
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Multiple Providers
In an oligopoly of multiple competing providers, each provider allocates re-
sources according to the weighted proportional allocation. We assume that
each provider k has a different constraint on the resources, which is captured
by a convex set Pk. We assume that each user can receive resources from
any provider and is concerned only with the total allocation received over all
providers. Note that both of these assumptions can be relaxed, as we can en-
code some constraints in the convex set Pk. We will use the following notation.
Let xki denote the allocation to user i by provider k. For each user i, the utility of
an allocation (xki , i = 1, . . . , n, k = 1, . . . ,m) is Ui(
∑
k x
k
i ). Let xi =
∑
k x
k
i denote the
total allocation to user i over all providers. We denote with x−ki = xi − xki the total
allocation to user i over all providers except provider k.
Let ~x = (xki , i = 1, . . . , n, k = 1, . . . ,m) be an allocation under weighted pro-
portional sharing mechanism. It is analog to the argument in Section 5.2 that
given ~x, each provider k can find the weights (Ck1, ...,Ckn) such that ~x is the equi-
librium of the weighted proportional sharing in the multiple providers’ setting.
In this setting the payment of user i to provider k is wki , and the user’s goal is to
maximize Ui(∑k xki )−∑k wki , where xki = Cki wki /∑i wki . The provider k, on the other
hand, obtains the revenue Rk, which satisfies the following
n∑
i=1
U′i (x−ki + xki )xki
U′i (x−ki + xki )xki + Rk
= 1. (5.14)
In order to gain some intuition, note that for every i, Ui(x) is a concave func-
tion, thus U′i (x−ki + xki ) decreases with x−ki . From this, we can see that the marginal
utility for a user with a provider k decreases if the user already received alloca-
tions from other providers. As a result, provider k may extract smaller revenue
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due to competition with other providers. With this in mind, we now define an
equilibrium in the case of multiple providers.
DEFINITION 5.1 We call ~x an equilibrium allocation if for every k, the allocation
vector ~xk = (xk1, . . . , xkn) maximizes Rk given by (5.14) over the set Pk.
We note that in the multiple providers’ setting, we think of the game as the
provider k’s strategy set is Pk. The discrimination weights and the revenue then
can be calculated according to the allocation vector ~x of all providers. With these
discrimination weights under users’ selfish behaviour ~x will be an outcome of
the game. From providers’ perpective, an equilibrium is an ~x where no provider
has an incentive to unilaterally change its allocation vector. Note that when
there is only one provider, this game is the same as the two-stage Stackelberg
game defined in Section 5.2.
A Class of Utility Functions
We next define a class of utility functions. The following definition may appear
technical, however, it has a strong connection with the theory of third-degree
price discrimination [56, 57]. It turns out that our class of utility functions
covers most of interesting and commonly used utility functions in the litera-
ture. For example, the linear utilities used in sponsored search model, trun-
cated linear utility functions or logarithmic functions considered representative
of real-time traffic requirements in communication network scenarios [52], con-
cave marginal utilities considered in [17], polynomial utility functions used in a
model of trade [26], some of α-fair utility functions [39, 24] that are widely used
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in the context of network resource sharing and a class of utility functions that
characterize TCP-like connections [22].
DEFINITION 5.2 Let U(x) be a non-negative, non-decreasing, and concave utility
function and let x0 ≥ 0 be the value maximizing U ′(x)x. We call U(x), δ-utility, if, in
addition, the following two conditions hold: (i) U ′(x)x is a concave function over [0, x0],
and (ii) there exists δ ∈ [0,∞), such that for every a ∈ [0, x0],
U(b) − [U′(a)a]′b ≤ δU(a),
where b is defined as such U ′(b) = [U′(a)a]′ = U′(a) + U′′(a)a ≥ 0.
In Figure 5.3, we show geometric interpretations of the latter definition. In this
figure, LW ≤ δ where (left) L and W are lengths of the line segments and (right) L
is the shaded and W is the hatched area.
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Figure 5.3: Geometric interpretations of δ-Utilities.
We have the following result.
LEMMA 5.7 If f and g are δ-utilities, then so are: c · f , for c > 0 and f + g.
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Proof. It is straightforward to show that c · f is a δ-utility function. In the fol-
lowing, we show f + g is a δ-utility function
Let h = f + g. Given a ≥ 0, let b ≥ 0 be such that
[h′(a)a]′ = h′(b). (5.15)
We need to show that h(b) − h′(b)b ≤ δh(a), which corresponds to
f (b) − f ′(b)b + g(b) − g′(b)b ≤ δ( f (a) + g(a)). (5.16)
Let b1 and b2 be such that
[ f ′(a)a]′ = f ′(b1) (5.17)
[g′(a)a]′ = g′(b2) (5.18)
and, without loss of generality, assume b1 ≤ b2. Since f and g are δ-utilities, the
following two relations hold
f (b1) − f ′(b1)b1 ≤ δ f (a) and g(b2) − g′(b2)b2 ≤ δg(a).
Hence,
f (b1) − f ′(b1)b1 + g(b2) − g′(b2)b2 ≤ δ( f (a) + g(a)). (5.19)
In view of (5.16) and (5.19), it suffices to show that
f (b) − f ′(b)b + g(b) − g′(b)b ≤ f (b1) − f ′(b1)b1 + g(b2) − g′(b2)b2. (5.20)
Note that [h′(a)a]′ = [ f ′(a)a]′ + [g′(a)a]′. Combining with (5.15), (5.17), and
(5.18), we observe
f ′(b1) + g′(b2) = f ′(b) + g′(b).
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Using this identity it is not difficult to conclude that b1 ≤ b ≤ b2 and that we can
rewrite (5.20) as
f (b) − f ′(b1)b + g(b) − g′(b2)b ≤ f (b1) − f ′(b1)b1 + g(b2) − g′(b2)b2.
The latter inequality indeed holds if the following two inequalities hold
f (b) − f (b1) ≤ f ′(b1)(b − b1)
g(b2) − g(b) ≥ g′(b2)(b2 − b)
but the latter two inequalities are indeed true as b1 ≤ b ≤ b2 and both f and g
are concave functions.
Remark One can show that a linear function is 0-utility, a polynomial U(x) =
(c + x)α for c ≥ 0 is a e2 -utility for any 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, or a logarithmic function is a
2-utility. From this and Lemma 5.7, we can see that for example, any polynomial
of the form ∑i aixαi , where ai > 0 and 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1 is a e2 -utility.
The following lemma shows that many utility functions found in literature
are δ-utilities.
LEMMA 5.8 We have the following properties:
(i) U(x) = αx, for α > 0, or a truncated linear function, that is, U(x) = min{αx, y},
for every x ≥ 0, for some y > 0, is a 0-utility;
(ii) U(x) such that U′(x) is a concave function is a 2-utility;
(iii) U(x) = log
(
c+x
c
)
, for c > 0, is a 2-utility;
(iv) U(x) = (c + x)α for c ≥ 0 is a e2 -utility for 0 < α ≤ 1.
Proof. We show proofs for each item in the following.
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Item (i)
It suffices to consider truncated linear functions, i.e. for α > 0 and y > 0, U(x) =
min{αx, y}, x ≥ 0, as linear functions are a special case with y = ∞. Clearly, we
have U(b) − U′(b)b = 0, for any b ≥ 0, hence δ = 0.
Item (ii)
Consider the tangent to U′(x) at the point x = a; see Figure 5.4. This tangent
forms the triangle BDF. Note that the area L is less or equal to the area of the
triangle BDF. The side DF of the triangle is of length −2U ′′(a)a. The side FB of
the triangle is of length 2a. Hence, the area of the triangle is equal to −2U ′′(a)a2.
Now, note that the area W is greater or equal to the area of the rectangle ACEF.
The sides of this rectangle are of length −U ′′(a)a and a. Hence, the area of the
rectangle is −U′′(a)a2. It follows that L/W ≤ 2.
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Figure 5.4: U′(x) concave.
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Item (iii)
We have
U′(x) = 1
c + x
and [U′(x)x]′ = c(c + x)2 .
From U′(b) = [U′(a)a]′ we have
U′(b) = 1
c + b =
c
(c + a)2
and
b = (c + x)
2
c
− c.
It follows
U(b) − U′(b)b
U(a) =
2 log
(
c+a
c
)
+
(
c
c+a
)2 − 1
log
(
c+a
c
)
=
2 log(u) − u2 + 1
log(u) = 2 −
u2 − 1
log(u) := ϕ(u)
where u = c/(c + a). Since (u2 − 1)/ log(u) ≥ 0, we have ϕ(u) ≤ 2, for all u ∈ [0, 1].
This bound is tight; achieved at u = 0.
Item (iv)
We have
U(x) = (c + x)α and U′(x) = α(c + x)α−1,
[U′(x)x]′ = α(c + x)α−1
[
1 − (1 − α) x
c + x
]
.
It follows
U(b) − U′(b)b
U(a) = (1 − α)
[
1 − (1 − α) a
c + a
]− α1−α
+ α
c
c + a
[
1 − (1 − α) a
c + a
]
. (5.21)
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Let us consider the right-hand side with the following change of variables
u = a/(c + a), and we denote the formula by fα(u). We have
fα(u) := (1 − α) [1 − (1 − α)u]− α1−α + α(1 − u) [1 − (1 − α)u] .
It is not difficult to note that f ′α(u) is non-decreasing on [0, 1], hence fα(u) is a
convex function on [0, 1]. It follows that the function fα(u) over u ∈ [0, 1] achieves
maximum at either u = 0 or u = 1, with values fα(0) = 1 and fα(1) = (1 − α)α− α1−α .
We have
fα(u) ≤ max{1, (1 − α)α− α1−α }
We now show that (1 − α)α− α1−α ≤ e2 . By this we will prove the lemma.
0 0.5 10
0.5
1
1.5
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(1−
α
)α
−
α
/(1
−α
)
Figure 5.5: The function (1 − α)α− α1−α versus α.
Indeed, the function f (α) := (1 − α)α− α1−α achieves the maximum value at the
same points as the function g(u) = log f (α). We have
g(α) = log(1 − α) − α
1 − α log(α).
It is straightforward to obtain
g′(α) = 1
1 − α
[
2 +
1
1 − α log(α)
]
.
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At a point α∗ at which g(α) is maximum, we have g′(α∗) = 0, which is equivalent
to
α∗ = e−2(1−α
∗).
It follows
f (α∗) = (1 − α∗)e2α∗ = (1 − α∗)e−2(1−α∗)e2 ≤ e2 max
x∈[0,1]
xe−2x =
e
2
.
Efficiency Bound
We now state and prove the main theorem of this section.
THEOREM 5.9 Assume that for every user i and every a ≥ 0, U ′i (x + a)x is a con-
tinuous and concave function. Then, there exists an equilibrium in the case of multiple
providers defined as above. Furthermore if Ui(a+ x) are δ-utilities, then the efficiency at
any equilibrium is at least 1/(1 + 2/√3 + δ).
Note that when the utility functions are linear, i.e. δ = 0, we have Theorem 5.4
as a special case. The result of Theorem 5.9 is rather surprising as it is not a
priori clear that in a complex system where both users and providers aim at
selfishly maximizing their individual payoffs (objectives which often conflict
each other), the efficiency would be bounded by a constant that is independent
of the number of users and the number of providers.
Proof of the first part of Theorem 5.9. The proof for the first part of the theo-
rem about the existence of a Nash equilibrium uses standard fixed point argu-
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ment. For both price taking users and price anticipating users, a Nash equi-
librium is determined by a set of allocation vectors (~x1, . . . , ~xm) ∈ P1 × · · · × Pm.
Consider the conventional best-response function
F : P1 × · · · × Pm → P1 × · · · × Pm
such that (~y1, . . . , ~ym) = F(~x1, . . . , ~xm), where ~yk is the allocation vector that maxi-
mizes the revenue for provider k, assuming other providers do not change their
allocations. This mapping is continuous and thus by the fixed-point theorem,
there exists an allocation vector where no provider k can increase his revenue
by changing the allocation vector ~xk, which is a Nash equilibrium.
For the second part, the key idea of the proof is to bound the social welfare by
an affine function which allows separating the maximization over (~x1, . . . , ~xm) ∈
∑
k Pk to maximizations over the sets Pk, where
∑
k Pk := {~z1+ · · ·+~zm : ~zk ∈ Pk, k =
1, . . . ,m} is the Minkowski sum of the sets Pk. Once the optimization problem is
separated, we can use a similar bound as in Section 5.4 ( see Lemma 5.10 below)
as a subroutine to prove the theorem. Now, let
vki = U′i (xi) + U′′i (xi)xki , for each i, and vi = mink v
k
i .
Since for every i, Ui(x) is a concave function, U ′′i (x) is non-positive, and thus,
vi = U′i (xi) + U′′i (xi)(maxk xki ) ≥ U′i (xi) + U′′i (xi)xi. The last inequality is because of
the fact xi =
∑
k x
k
i .
Now, let us define Vi(x) = ai + vix where ai is chosen so that Vi(x) is a tangent
to Ui(x). We will use Vi as an upper bound of Ui. By the definition of δ-utility
functions, we have ai ≤ L ≤ δUi(xi), where
L = Ui(xi) − (U′(xi) + U′′i (xi)xi)yi
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Figure 5.6: Upper-bounding Ui(x) by an affine function Vi(x).
and yi is defined such that U′i (yi) = U′(xi) + U′′i (xi)xi. (See Figure 5.6.) Therefore,
∑
i
ai ≤ δ
∑
Ui(xi). (5.22)
Since Ui(x) is a non-negative concave function, we have Ui(x) ≤ Vi(x). Hence,
max~z∈∑k Pk
∑
i Ui(zi) ≤ max~z∈∑k Pk
∑
i Vi(zi) =
=
∑
i ai +max~z∈∑k Pk
∑
i vizi =
∑
i ai +
∑
k max~z∈Pk
∑
i vizi. (5.23)
The last is a key inequality as it enables us to use the fact that vizi are linear
functions, therefore, instead of considering the maximization over the set ∑k Pk
we can bound ∑i vizi over each Pk.
By similar arguments as in the proof of Theorem 5.4, we can prove the fol-
lowing lemma.
LEMMA 5.10 For ever k,
∑
i
U′i (xi)xki ≥
1
1 + 2/
√
3
max
z∈Pk
∑
i
vki zi. (5.24)
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Proof. By similar argument as in the proof of Theorem 5.4, we can assume the
convex set Pk is of the form
∑
i
γix
k
i = 1, with γi ≥ 0 for each i,
and we can derive the condition
either xi = 0 or
1
γi
[U′i (xi)xki ]′
(U′i (xi)xki + Rk)2
=
1
γi
vki
(U′i (xi)xki + Rk)2
= p > 0. (5.25)
Let us use the following notation
ai =
vki
γi
and yi =
U′i (xi)xki
U′i (xi)xki + Rk
for each user i. (5.26)
Without loss of generality, assume that a1 ≥ a2 ≥ · · · ≥ an.
From (5.26), we have
∑
i
U′i (xi)xki = Rk
∑
i
yi
1 − yi
≥ Rk
 y11 − y1 +
∑
i≥2
yi
 =
= Rk
(
y1
1 − y1
+ (1 − y1)
)
= Rk
y21 − y1 + 1
1 − y1
. (5.27)
While
max
z∈Pk
∑
i
vki zi = maxi
ai = a1.
It is straightforward to see that the following holds U ′i (xi)xki = Rk yi1−yi .
Therefore, for every i,
γix
k
i = R
k γi
U′i (xi)
yi
1 − yi
.
However,
ai =
[U′i (xi)xki ]′
γi
≤ U
′
i (xi)
γi
.
Therefore, we have
γix
k
i = R
k γi
U′i (xi)
yi
1 − yi
≤ Rk 1
ai
yi
1 − yi
.
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Thus,
a1 = a1(
∑
i
zi)γixki ≤ a1R∗
∑
i
yi
ai(1 − yi)
We also have
either yi = 0 or
ai(1 − yi)2
(Rk)2 = p > 0. (5.28)
From the latter, the analysis follows the same steps as in the proof of Theo-
rem 5.4, which yields the result
∑
i
U′i (xi)xki ≥
1
1 + 2/
√
3
max
z∈Pk
∑
i
vki zi.
.
We now use this Lemma to prove our main result.
Proof of the second part of Theorem 5.9 On the one hand, if we sum the left-
hand side of (5.24) over all k, we have
∑
k,i
U′i (xi)xki =
∑
i
U′i (xi)xi ≤
∑
i
Ui(xi) (5.29)
where the last inequality is true because Ui(x) is a non-negative and concave
function for every i.
On the other hand, if we sum the right-hand side of (5.24) over all k, we
obtain ∑
k
1
1 + 2/
√
3
max
z∈Pk
∑
i
vki zi ≥
1
1 + 2/
√
3
∑
k
max
z∈Pk
∑
i
vizi, (5.30)
where in the last inequality, vki are replaced by vi, which recall is equal to mink vki .
Combining (5.24), (5.29) and (5.30), we derive
∑
i
Ui(xi) ≥ 1
1 + 2/
√
3
∑
k
max
z∈Pk
∑
i
vizi.
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From this we obtain
(1 + 2/
√
3)
∑
i
Ui(xi) ≥
∑
k
max
z∈Pk
∑
i
vizi. (5.31)
Finally, from (5.22), (5.23) and (5.31), we have
max
~z∈∑k Pk
∑
i
Ui(zi) ≤ (δ + 1 + 2/
√
3)
∑
i
Ui(xi),
which establishes the asserted result.
5.6 Related Literature
Our results in this chapter follows the line of work on proportional sharing
of [23, 20, 42]. Most of these results, however, do not investigate the incen-
tive of profit maximizing providers. There are some recent works investigating
the revenue of more general proportional mechanisms which is called quasi-
proportional sharing [38, 44]. The work presented in this chapter is based on a
joint work with M. Vojnovic´ [43].
The literature on sponsored search applications is expanding in both eco-
nomics [58, 10, 6] and computer science [3, 36]. Also see the survey [28] and the
references therein.
The results in this chapter also analyze the case of multiple providers com-
peting for the same set of buyers. Similar problems are considered in [1, 2, 17].
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
6.1 Summary
In this thesis, we studied the classical proportional sharing mechanism for gen-
eral polyhedral environment with the focus on the revenue of the mechanism.
The proportional sharing is a natural, simple and robust mechanism. This is
the main motivation to investigate this class of mechanisms. The insights we
learned from this investigation are:
• Proportional sharing is not only efficient, natural and scalable but also
generates high revenue under a symmetric condition among users.
• Without the symmetric condition, the proportional sharing mechanism
can be combined with other mechanisms to gain competitive revenue.
• The weighted proportional sharing can be studied as a framework where
providers aim to maximize the revenue under a discrimination pricing
scheme. This is natural and quite efficient even in a complex environment
of multiple providers competing for profit.
• For the application of keyword auctions, we formulate a general model
for the keyword auction application. Our approach can model a complex
externalities among advertisers. We believe this is an important feature
that needs further investigation and the model can be used for other ap-
plications as well.
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6.2 Future Research
There are several open directions for future research. I will describe some gen-
eral directions that I think are important and promising.
Nash Implementation versus Truthful Mechanisms The thesis uses Nash
equilibrium as the solution concept in designing mechanism. Nash implemen-
tation in full information settings assumes that users knows about all others’ in-
formation, but the planer does not have this knowledge. Nash implementation
is a strictly weaker concept than truthful mechanisms. However, the following
question is not well understood. How much more revenue can we gain by using
Nash implementation rather than using truthful mechanisms?
Collusion in Mechanism Design In computer science applications, the con-
dition on simplicity and robustness of mechanisms are crucial. These issues
are the current challenges of the area. One of the well recognized approaches
is the prior-free mechanism design. That is, to design mechanism without the
knowledge of the types’s distributions. But there are other directions concern-
ing the robustness of mechanisms as well. For example, the robustness condi-
tions against the collusion of users. Several models have been proposed and
studied in Bayesian settings, such as the ring model of McAfee and McMil-
lan [35] or the mechanism of Laffont [27].
It is of great interests to investigate the effects on the revenue of collusion in
mechanism design in prior-free settings or in Nash equilibria of full information
games. Allowing bidders to collude in an arbitrary way can lead to a very low
revenue. One of the possible directions is to consider the collusion structures
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that can be represented by a set system: only bidders that belong to the same
set can collude.
Mechanism Design with Many Sellers One of the main criticism in the field
of mechanism design is about the control assumption, as named by T. Palfrey [47],
which stipulates that the planner can control all communication that agents can
undertake. When this control is not feasible, the system is ruled by complex in-
teraction among multiple mechanism designers. In fact, this is the case in most
systems of computer science settings. Research in Bayesian multi-contracting
mechanism design is still in early stage, see the survey of D. Martinmort [31]
and recent works of M. Pai [45, 46]. The difficulty in this area is that the reve-
lation principle does not hold when there are many sellers. The direct revela-
tion mechanisms generally do not suffice to describe the whole set of equilib-
rium allocation. And in general, analyzing multi-sellers buyers games is fairly
complex in Bayesian settings. It is of great interests to define special cases of
these Bayesian games, where there is a characterization as in the case of single
seller [40]. On the other hand, the situation is easier in full information settings,
see for example the work of Blume et al. [9], one of results in this thesis also
extends to the case of multiple providers.
A hybrid approach between Bayesian and full information games might lead
to interesting results. Can we model and analyze games consisting of multiple
players that capture some types of information asymmetry among players? This
is a challenging problem that goes beyond the well understood model of mech-
anism design with single seller and will have impact on other related research
areas
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